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This dissertation consists of three essays.  The first essay is an experimental study 
that examines a relative new type of arbitration called α-Final Offer Arbitration.  The 
second is a theoretical study that introduces inequality aversion as a new explanatory 
factor for low agreements rates during disputes under arbitration mechanism.  The final 
essay analyzes the effects of different polices on the price stricter in a two-sided market 
monopoly. 
Promising results to improve arbitration used in the field are obtained from 
Amended Final Offer Arbitration (AFOA), which outperforms Final-Offer Arbitration 
(FOA) and weakly outperforms Conventional Arbitration (CA). The first essay presents 
an experiment to evaluate a more general case of AFOA, α-Final Offer Arbitration (α-
FOA). This mechanism is similar to a second-price auction, which punishes the loser 
with a value proportional (α) to the difference between her final offer and the arbitrator’s 
fair settlement. The experiment furthermore divides the pool of subjects within a session 
into two groups according to their estimated risk preferences in order to assess how the 







Although agreement rates overall are low, the results show that α-FOA has a 
significantly higher agreement rate than both CA and FOA. Contrary to theoretical 
prediction the more risk-averse group of subjects does not have a higher agreement rate 
than the less risk-averse group of subjects. 
The second essay proposes an as yet unstudied factor to explain disagreements 
between disputants under α-Final Offer Arbitration and Conventional Arbitration. Using 
a utility function proposed by Fehr & Schmidt (1999) that includes inequality aversion, 
the model predicts that two risk-neutral disputants will not reach an agreement if one of 
them has positively biased beliefs about the size of the pie. 
The third essay investigates the effects of different policies on price structure and 
consumer surplus in a two-sided market monopoly. In a laboratory environment, most of 
the monopolists charge a price below cost even if there is no threat of new competitors. 
A policy that imposes that the monopolist must charge the same price for both sides of 
the market decreases the total consumer surplus, while a policy that imposes that prices 
must be above costs decreases the total consumer surplus even more. A tax that increases 
the cost on one side of the market leads to a decrease in the price that monopolist charges 
on the other side of the market. These results suggest that the policymakers should 









CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has five chapters. This introductory chapter, a literature review chapter 
on types of arbitration, two experimental studies about arbitration mechanisms and two-
sided markets (chapters 3 and 5), and a theoretical chapter about the effect of inequality 
aversion on the agreements rates achieved by various arbitration mechanisms. 
Chapter 2 presents different theoretical models of arbitration mechanism that have 
been proposed in order to improve the agreements rates obtained under Conventional 
Arbitration (CA). Stevens (1966) proposes Final Offer Arbitration (FOA). Under FOA 
the arbitrator chooses the final offer submitted by the two disputants that she thinks is 
closer to the fair settlement value. Stevens’ (1966) intuition is that because under FOA 
the arbitrator cannot split the difference between the final two offers, the disputants try to 
submit final offers closer to the arbitrator’s fair settlement. This induces those two final 
offers to converge to an agreement. Brams and Merrill (1983) prove that this intuition is 
not correct. The two final offers under FOA do not converge to an agreement. Because of 
that Brams and Merrill (1986) propose Combined Arbitration (CombA), which is a 
combination of CA and FOA. With some assumptions about the distribution function that 
describes disputants’ beliefs about the arbitrator’s choice of the fair settlement, the 
theoretical prediction for CombA is that two risk-neutral disputants submit final offers 






predictions is Double-Offer Arbitration (DOA), proposed by Zeng (1996). Zeng (2003) 
proposes another type of arbitration, Amended Final Offer Arbitration (AFOA), which 
has a more general case called Alpha-Final Offer Arbitration (α-FOA). This type of 
arbitration is similar to a second-price auction in the sense that the final outcome of the 
arbitration does not depend on the final offer of the winner of the arbitration. 
Chapter 3 is an experimental paper about risk preferences and agreements rates 
under α-FOA. While several arbitration mechanisms have a theoretical prediction that 
two risk-neutral disputants will reach an agreement under that specific arbitration 
mechanism, the most used arbitration mechanisms in the field are CA and FOA. However 
in laboratory experiments most of these arbitration mechanisms such as CombA or DOA, 
do not obtain higher agreement rates than CA. The only arbitration mechanism that 
obtains weakly higher agreement rates than CA is AFOA. 
AFOA is just a particular case of α-FOA, for which    . For this paper I 
compare the agreement rates under α-FOA to the agreement rates under CA, FOA and 
under a treatment similar to a strike in which the two disputants get a payoff of $0 if they 
do not reach an agreement by themselves. The value of   can be viewed as a 
measurement of punishment for the disputant that submits an aggressive final offer and 
loses the arbitration. Because I want to give more incentive than under AFOA to the 
disputants to reach an agreement by themselves, I choose    . The results indicate that 
α-FOA outperforms FOA and CA, but does not reach agreements rate close to the 
predicted one (100%) for the more risk-averse group of people. 
Another contribution of this paper is that it takes into consideration the risk 






they might create a situation in which theoretically there is no contract zone. This leads to 
no agreement no matter what the arbitration mechanism is. This paper elicits the risk 
preferences of the subjects, ranks the subjects according to their risk preference and splits 
the pool of the subjects into a more risk-averse group of subjects (which might include 
only risk-averse and risk-neutral subjects) and a less risk-averse group of subjects (which 
might include risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-seeking subjects). However, the results 
indicate that the agreement rate for the more risk-averse group of subjects is no higher 
than the agreement rate for the less risk-averse group of subjects. 
Chapter 4 is a theoretical paper that introduces another factor in order to explain 
why the agreement rates under different arbitration mechanisms are lower than predicted, 
even for risk-neutral and risk-averse individuals. In most experimental studies of the 
arbitration mechanism there is also a treatment similar to a strike in which the two 
disputants get a payoff of $0 if they do not reach an agreement by themselves. In this 
treatment the agreement rates are lower than the predicted ones. While the low agreement 
rates under the treatments that involve an arbitration mechanism can be explained by the 
mechanism itself, by the risk preferences of disputants or by the disputants’ beliefs about 
the arbitrator choice of a fair settlement, in this treatment these factors are not involved. 
This suggests that there may be other factors involved in the decision of the two 
disputants. My suggestion is that inequality aversion can explain this difference between 
the theoretical predictions and the experimental results. 
Contrary to previous theoretical predictions, the results shows that two risk-






do not reach an agreement if they exhibit inequality aversion and if at least one has 
positively biased beliefs about the size of the pie. 
The last chapter is an experimental study of the effects of different policies on 
price structure and on consumer surplus in a two-sided market monopoly. A two-sided 
market has counterintuitive properties and regular policies might not have the desired 
effects. For example, a monopolist might set a price on one side of the market below cost 
not as a predatory pricing strategy, but because that it is the optimal price structure.  This 
may be true even if there is no threat of a new entry. A policy that restricts the 
monopolists’ price to be at or above cost might thus lead to a decrease in consumer 
surplus. A policy that restricts the monopolist to set the same price on both sides of the 
market might have a similar effect. 
The results of the experiment show that most of the monopolists do in fact charge 
a price below cost on one side of the market even if there is no threat of new entry. For 
the specific parameters implemented in the experiment, a policy that constrains the 
monopolists to charge prices at or above costs decreases total consumer surplus by 18.1%. 
When the monopolists are constrained to charge the same price on both sides of the 
market, total surplus decreases by 10.4%. Contrary to the prediction on would obtain in a 
one-sided market monopoly, an increase in cost on one side of the market decreases the 








CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON TYPE OF ARBITRATION 
MECHANISMS 
In some economic sectors and occupations, a strike is not allowed as a solution 
for a dispute between management and employees. For instance, firefighters are not 
allowed to go on strike when negotiating with management for wages or benefits if an 
agreement is not reached. In order to solve this type of dispute, both parties are forced by 
law to participate in arbitration. The type of arbitration typically still used is CA. After 
Stevens (1966) proposed FOA as a new type of arbitration, FOA began being used to 
solve disputes. For instance FOA has been utilized since 1974 during Major League 
Baseball negotiations between baseball players and team owners. Other arbitration 
mechanisms have been proposed, but none are used in practice. 
Stevens (1966) observes that CA does not effectively encourage the disputants to 
reach an agreement mainly due to Conventional Arbitration's method of "split the 
difference" compromise of the arbitrator. As a solution to this problem Stevens (1966) 
proposes Final-Offer Arbitration. Comparing to CA where the arbitrator can choose any 
value as the final settlement of the arbitration, FOA obliges the arbitrator to choose only 
between the final two offers of the disputants. In general under CA, the arbitrator is 
inclined to split the difference between the final offers of the disputants. This leads the 
disputants to make extreme final offers, in order to get a better final settlement when the 






arbitrator is forced to choose between the final offers of the disputants (and not allowed 
to just "split the difference") then there is less incentive for disputants to make extreme 
final offers because it would be less likely that the arbitrator would select their offer as a 
fair settlement. In addition, FOA encourages disputants to make final offers that are more 
likely to converge, allowing disputants to reach an agreement without forcing an 
arbitrator to make the final decision. 
Brams and Merrill (1983) study the equilibrium strategy for FOA and find that 
FOA will not induce the two disputants to converge to the arbitrator's median fair 
settlement and it will not cause them to reach an agreement. The intuition is that by 
starting with a certain point, the expected gain by making a more flexible offer, in order 
to win arbitration, will be smaller than the cost of the disputant would incur by making 
the offer more flexible. Brams and Merrill (1983) assume a zero sum game between two 
players in which each player tries to maximize her expected payoff given that they have 
some beliefs about what the arbitrator thinks is a fair settlement. Both players have the 
same beliefs about the arbitrator’s fair settlement and their beliefs are defined as a 
probability distribution function. For robustness, they solve the equilibrium strategies for 
different distribution functions. The main result is that the optimal final offers are more 
dispersed for "flat" distributions and will not converge to an agreement. The two optimal 
final offers tend to be separated by two standard deviations. This conclusion is important 
because FOA was designed to solve the problem of CA and help the two disputants to 
reach an agreement. 
Several arbitration mechanisms that predict that the two final offers will converge 






Merrill (1986), Double-Offer Arbitration (DOA) proposed by Zeng et al. (1996) and 
Amended Final Offer Arbitration (AFOA) proposed by Zeng (2003).  
Brams and Merrill (1986) present a new type of arbitration: Combined Arbitration 
(CombA). CombA is a combination of CA and FOA. Under CombA, if the disputants do 
not reach an agreement, even after they submit their final offers, one type of arbitration 
will be applied depending on arbitrator’s notion of a fair settlement. If the arbitrator's 
notion of a fair settlement is between the final offers, then the outcome of the arbitration 
is determined using FOA. If this value falls outside of the two offers, the outcome of the 
arbitration is determined using CA. The theoretical prediction is that if both parties try to 
maximize their expected payoffs, their offers will converge to the median of the 
arbitrator’s fair settlement, which is a global equilibrium if the probability distribution is 
continuous, unimodal, and symmetric around the median. 
Zeng et al (1996) propose Double-Offer Arbitration. For this type or arbitration, 
each disputant has to submit two offers: a primary offer   , and a secondary offer   . The 
primary offer represents the disputant's final request. The secondary offer represents the 
disputant's belief about the arbitrator's fair settlement. If neither of the primary or 
secondary offers converge to an agreement, then given these final offers and the value of 
her fair settlement   , the arbitrator calculates the value for a criterion function    for 
each disputant: 
  (      |  )   |      |  (   )(     )                                         ( ) 
  (      |  )   |     |  (   )(     )                                       ( ) 
The disputant that has a lowest criterion function value wins the arbitration and 






that a disputant can minimize his criterion function in two ways. One is to decrease the 
difference between his belief about the fair settlement and the real value of the fair 
settlement. This will cause the disputant to be less optimistic about the fair settlement. 
The second way an individual can minimize his criterion function is to decrease the 
difference between his request and his belief about the fair settlement. This causes the 
disputant to offer a moderate final request. Zeng et al (1996) shows that the two 
secondary offers of the disputants should converge to the median of the distribution 
function, which describes the notion of arbitrator’s fair if the arbitrator puts more weight 
on the second final offer, i.e.      . 
Zeng (2003) presents another arbitration procedure called Amended Final Offer 
Arbitration. This new procedure amends FOA and is similar to the second-price auction 
proposed by Vickrey (1961). Compared to FOA, where the final outcome of the 
arbitration procedure depends on the final offer of the winner of the arbitration, the final 
outcome of AFOA depends on the final offer of the loser of the arbitration. Under FOA, 
the final offer has two functions: to win the arbitration and to determine the final 
settlement. These two functions are not compatible in the sense that a disputant should 
select increasing (decreasing) values for the first function, and decreasing (increasing) 
values for the second function. Therefor the optimal final offers of the two disputants will 
not converge. Under AFOA, the winner of the arbitration procedure is the disputant that 
has a final offer closer to the arbitrator fair settlement as in FOA. However the final 
outcome of the arbitration is equal to the fair settlement value of the arbitrator minus 
(plus) the distance between this value and the final offer of the loser depending if the 






the outcome of the arbitration is not determined by disputant’s own final offer, but by his 
opponent's final offer. Similar to a second-price auction, the disputant have no constraints 
on the value of the outcome when he submits his final offer. His final offer will be 
selected with the goal of maximizing his opportunity to win the arbitration. Zeng (2003) 
demonstrates that if the arbitrator’s fair settlement is described by continuous and discrete 
distribution functions, the final offers will converge to the expected value of the 
arbitrator's fair settlement and the two disputants reach an agreement. 
Brams and Merrill (1986) assume symmetry in the distribution function of the 
arbitrator’s choice of the fair settlement in order to establish the existence of equilibrium 
under CombA. Without this assumption, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. DOA 
and AFOA do not need such assumptions for the existence of the equilibrium. The 
equilibrium strategy for DOA is the median of the distribution function that describes the 
arbitrator’s choice of the fair settlement, while for AFOA it is the expected value of this 
distribution function. The different results are due to how the value of the final outcome 
of arbitration is calculated under these two arbitration mechanisms. Under DOA, the 
arbitrator’s choice of a fair settlement decides who wins the arbitration, but the value of 
final outcome is independent of the value of this choice. Under AFOA the value of 
arbitrator’s choice also determines the value of the final outcome. Because of this, the 
final offers under the two arbitration mechanisms converge to the median and to the 
expected value, respectively. 
Zeng (2003) also presents a general version of AFOA called Alpha-Final Offer 
Arbitration (α-FOA). Similar to AFOA, the two offers converge to the expected value of 







The difference is that for this type of arbitration, the punishment of the loser can be 
lighter or harsher depending on the value of the parameter α. A higher value for α implies 
a harsher punishment for the loser. For α-FOA the final outcome of the arbitration is 
equal to the value of the fair settlement of the arbitrator minus or plus (depending if the 
winner is the “buyer” or “seller”) a proportion (α) of the distance between the “fair 
settlement” value and the final offer of the loser.  
                   |        |                                       ( ) 
where   is the arbitrator’s fair settlement value and        is the final offer of the loser. 











CHAPTER 3.  ALPHA-FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION AND RISK PREFERENCES 
3.1 Introduction 
When solving disputes, Conventional Arbitration (CA) and Final-Offer 
Arbitration (FOA) are the most commonly used methods of arbitration. However, 
theoretical predictions show that for these methods, final offers may not converge to 
allow for an agreement. Several theoretical arbitration mechanisms have been developed 
that can lead to agreement, but they do not outperform CA or FOA in laboratory 
experiments. Combined Arbitration (CombA) was proposed by Brams and Merrill (1986) 
and Zeng et al. (1996) proposed Double Offer Arbitration (DOA). The most promising 
results come from Amended Final Offer Arbitration (AFOA), proposed by Zeng (2003). 
Deck et al. (2007) find that in a laboratory experiment AFOA outperforms FOA and 
marginally outperforms CA. 
In this paper, I present an experiment that evaluates a more general case of AFOA, 
α-Final Offer Arbitration (α-FOA). AFOA is just a particular case of α-FOA, where 
   . This mechanism is similar to a second-price auction, in the sense that the final 
outcome value of the arbitration does not depend on the winner’s final offer. Also it 
punishes the loser with a value proportional (α) to the difference between her final offer 
and the arbitrator’s fair settlement. In order to increase the punishment for the loser of 







The experiment takes into account the relative risk preferences of the disputants, 
which, along with the type of arbitration used, plays an important role in influencing the 
outcome of a negotiation. Disputants should avoid arbitration if there is a contract zone, a 
region of outcomes that are mutually preferred to arbitration. However, the existence and 
the size of a contract zone depend on the risk preferences of the disputants. Zeng (2006) 
shows that if one disputant has risk-seeking preferences and has a coefficient of risk 
preference larger in absolute value than her opponent, the contract zone will not exist in 
CA, FOA or α-FOA. He also proves that if there is a contract zone, ceteris paribus, the 
size of the contract zone for α-FOA is larger for any     than the contract zone for CA 
and larger for any   
 
 
   than the contract zone for FOA. It is important to account 
for the risk preferences of the disputants when evaluating the empirical properties of 
these arbitration mechanisms. This experiment is the first to control for this factor. 
The experimental results show that even if the agreement rates overall are low, α-
FOA has significantly higher agreement rate than both CA and FOA. An interesting 
observation is related to whether subjects reach an agreement during negotiation or after 
they submit their final offers. The results show that the mean for agreement rates after 
they submit their final offers for α-FOA is strongly statistically significantly higher than 
the mean for agreement rates for both CA and FOA, while the mean for the agreement 
rates during negotiations for α-FOA is not statistically significant different than the 
agreement rates for FOA, but lower than for CA. This indicates stronger incentives to 
reach an agreement under α-FOA relative to CA and FOA. Contrary to theoretical 







than the agreement rate for the less risk-averse group of subjects for any arbitration 
mechanism. 
3.2 Literature review 
Although theoretically all the new procedures predict convergence, only CA and 
FOA are used in practice. Due to a lack of data for the other types of arbitration, in order 
to study the other theoretical models one must use a laboratory experiment.  
One of the first lab experiments related to arbitration procedures was presented by 
Ashenfelter et al. (1992). Ashenfelter et al. (1992) compare the dispute rates between 
different alternatives of arbitration like CA, FOA and tri-offer arbitration (in which the 
arbitrator selects one of the final offers of the disputants or an offer made by a neutral 
fact-finder). There is also a "no arbitration" treatment similar to a "strike" in real life, 
which will give a payoff of $0 in cases where the subjects do not reach an agreement. The 
subjects from the experiments are paired with the same partner throughout the entire 20 
rounds of a session. In each round they have to split a pie by choosing a number between 
100 and 500. The key result of the experiment is that FOA has dispute rates at least as 
high as in other arbitration mechanisms. This implies that FOA does not improve the 
agreement rates as Stevens (1966) suggested. The results also demonstrate that there is an 
inverse relationship between the cost of disputes and dispute rates. 
My experiment design is similar to the experiment of Dickinson (2004) research 
paper in which he studies CombA proposed by Brams and Merrill (1986). His experiment 
has four treatments: a no-arbitration treatment (NA) in which the subjects have a payoff 
of $0 if they do not reach an agreement, a CA, a FOA, and a CombA treatment. In each 







with the same partner for the entire experiment, which consists of 20 rounds of 2 minute 
long intervals, in which subjects had to decide upon the size of a variable  , which 
implied that they had to split in two a total of $2. Thru a payoff table they were able to 
observe their payoffs depending on the size of the variable  . For one partner, the payoff 
increases when   increases. For the other partner, the payoff increases when   decreases. 
Their payoff table gives a private suggested bargain interval in such a way that the split 
of the pie in half ($1 each), is not the half of this interval, in order to avoid a focal point 
problem. These intervals are [       ] and [       ], where the split of the pie in half 
is      . If the subjects did not reach an agreement after two minutes, they would go 
to arbitration. Each arbitration type was applied for 5 rounds. The order of the arbitration 
type was different for different pairs of subjects in order to avoid an order effect, and the 
subjects did not know that the arbitration procedure would change after 5 rounds. In case 
of arbitration, the fair settlement value was given by a random draw from a normal 
distribution with the mean equal to 500 and the standard variation equal to 60. The 
distribution was explained to the subjects through a table with 100 past values from this 
distribution. Looking at these values, the subjects were able to build some expectations 
about what the arbitrator might consider a fair settlement. 
Dickinson’s (2004) main results are that the dispute rates are lower for the NA 
treatment, which is consistent with Ashenfelter et al. (1992) findings and with the 
theoretical prediction that an increase in the cost of arbitration would reduce the dispute 
rates. However, different from the theoretical prediction, the difference in dispute rates 







dispute rates. Also FOA has higher disputes rates than CA, but difference in dispute rates 
between CA and FOA is only marginally statistically significant. 
In a similar experiment Dickinson (2005) compares DOA with CA and FOA. The 
main findings of this paper are that FOA has marginally higher dispute rates when 
compared to CA (similar to Ashenfelter et al. (1992) findings) and DOA will not 
decrease the dispute rates when compared to CA or FOA.  
Deck et al. (2007) compare the dispute rate for CA and FOA with AFOA. Using 
data from Deck et al. (2007b), in which they study the effect of the uncertainty value of 
bargaining in CA and FOA, they run four more sessions using AFOA. In his experiment, 
the bargaining is designed like a negotiation between a worker and a firm over the wage 
level. The wage is the payoff for the worker and the firm has a profit equal to a revenue 
(which is common knowledge for both firm and worker) minus the wage. The level of the 
revenue has some uncertainty: a high revenue level and a low revenue level, each occurs 
with probability 50%. Deck et al. (2007) also vary the difference between high revenue 
and low revenue, in two different environments. So besides the uncertainty induced by 
the arbitrator's choice, they introduce some uncertainty of the surplus. They also consider 
the fair settlement of the arbitrator as a random draw from a uniform distribution and not 
from a normal distribution as in Ashenfelter et al. (1992) and Dickinson (2005). Another 
difference in their experiment design is that they add a cost for arbitration. Their main 
finding are that the agreement rates for AFOA are strictly higher than the agreement rates 
for FOA and weakly higher than the ones for CA. 
Other studies related to arbitration procedures are reported by Dickinson (2006, 







risk preferences over the agreement rates of arbitration. His main findings are that 
optimism significantly increases the dispute rates and that risk aversion will not 
significantly change the dispute rates. Dickinson (2006) studies the chilling effect of 
optimism for FOA. Contrary to Stevens’ (1966) beliefs, the results show that FOA has a 
chilling effect over the negotiations. As Brams and Merrill (1983) show, the final two 
offers will not converge and negotiation will reach the arbitration stage. In addition, 
optimism of the two parties concerning what the arbitrator will deem as a fair settlement 
will increase even more the difference between these two final offers. The results of the 
experiment confirm this theoretical prediction. He demonstrates that optimism will not 
only make subjects who could marginally reach an agreement go to arbitration, but it will 
also make subjects who do not reach an agreement submit even more divergent final 
offers. Bolton and Katok (1998) study the effects of learning in repeated bargaining 
situations, with and without arbitration. Their findings suggest that there is a bargaining 
learning effect in both situations, with and without arbitration. Learning is slower when 
arbitration is used as compared to a situation with no arbitration. 
As presented in Dickinson (2009), two factors that play an important role in 
arbitration are optimism and the risk preference of the disputants. In a theoretical paper, 
Dickinson (2003) presents why and what the relationship is between these two factors 
and the agreements that can be reached in a dispute. The relationship is given by the 
contract zone: the region of outcomes which is mutually preferred with certainty by 
disputants instead of going for arbitration. In order to examine how these two factors 
influence the existence and size of the contract zone Dickinson (2003) presents a simple 







player is risk-averse and has a utility function of the form  ( )  √  and the second 
player is risk-neutral, so his utility function is  ( )    where   and   are the amounts 
that they obtain from the bargaining process. For a similar example assume that     
   . In cases where they do not reach an agreement, there will be a lottery that will give 
25 units to one player and 75 units to the other player, each with a probability of 50%. 
Given the utility functions and this lottery, one can calculate the certainty equivalent for 
each player. Any value greater than these certainty equivalent values of each player 
makes each player better off than the lottery would.  
Taking into consideration that        , there will be an interval of values, 
the contract zone, in which both players will prefer to avoid the lottery, interval such as in 
Figure 1. 
However, if the second player is risk-seeking and his utility function is  ( )  
   then his certainty equivalent value is equal to 55.90. With this certainty equivalent 
there is no value that is preferred by both players over the lottery. 
In this case, both players would prefer not to reach an agreement and would prefer 
the lottery. Similarly to arbitration, there is a contract zone, a region of outcomes that is 
mutually preferred by both players when compared to the arbitration procedure. However, 
the contract zone depends on disputants' risk preferences. This is an important factor in 
arbitration experiments, as different papers have presented (Holt and Laury (2002)) that 
in a subject pool, as in everyday bargaining and disputes, there are both risk-seeking 
subjects and risk-averse subjects. Risk-seeking subjects, no matter what the arbitration 
procedure applied, might force arbitration. Dickinson (2003) discusses the effects of 







the lottery depending on whether a person is an optimist (increasing the probability of 
winning the big prize of 75 units) or a pessimist (increasing the probability of winning 
the low prize of 25 units). Similarly, the contract zone can change size, and might 
disappear, in cases of optimistic subjects. 
In order to account for risk preferences of subjects, there are many methods that 
can be used to measure risk preferences of subjects in a lab experiment. The most 
common method used is the one presented by Holt and Laury (2002) and discussed in 
Holt and Laury (2005). The procedure is based on 10 different choices between two 
paired lotteries: option A and option B. Option A has a lower variability between the 
prizes ($2.00 and $1.60), where option B has a higher variability ($3.85 and $0.10). The 
probability of winning the big (small) prize increases (decreases) from 1/10 (9/10) by 
1/10 for each choice. Given the expected payoffs of the lotteries subjects should start by 
choosing option A and then should change to option B depending on their risk 
preferences. Given the number of choices of option A, Holt and Laury (2002) calculate 
the relative risk aversion coefficient. 
Other procedures used to measure the risk preference of a subject were proposed 
by Eckel and Grossman (2008), in which they offer more simplistic lottery choices, and 
Andreoni and Harbaugh (2009), in which they present a procedure in which the subjects 
have a continuum of choices. 
An interesting study about different methods of risk preference elicitation is 
Dulleck et al (2011). For their study, they choose to study Holt and Laury's (2002) 
method and Andreoni and Harbaugh's (2009). They find that there is a similar 







and their replication of this experiment, but when they compare their results from the 
replication of Andreoni and Harbaugh's (2009) experiment, they find a much higher 
number of risk neutral subjects: 60% compared to around 25% from Holt and Laury 
(2002). These results raise an important question about the veracity of risk elicitation in 
an experiment, but to my knowledge these are the best methods available in the literature. 
The results are similar to Dave et al.'s (2010) paper in which they study which method is 
better to use: a simpler one like Eckel and Grossman's (2008) or a more complex one like 
Holt and Laury's (2002). Their results indicate that the answer to this question depends on 
the task that an individual is studying. However, even though it was not part of their 
research question, they find a difference in preference heterogeneity using the two 
methods 
3.3 Experiment Design 
This experiment has two stages. In the first stage, I elicit the risk preferences of 
the subjects by using a lottery-choice experiment similar to the experiment proposed by 
Holt and Laury (2002). In the second stage, I utilize a bargaining experiment in which 
different types of arbitration are used in order to settle possible impasses in agreements. 
For this stage, I use settings similar to Dickinson's experiments but add α-FOA as a new 
mechanism.  
In the first stage, subjects choose between fifteen pairs of lotteries. One lottery is 
a “safer” one and gives a payoff of $1 with a probability of 1. The “riskier” lottery has a 
high payoff of $3 and a low payoff of $0. The odds of winning the high payoff will 
increase by 1/20 starting from 0/20 chances until 14/20 chances, while the odds of 







chances. The “safer” lottery is called “Option A” and the riskier lottery is called ”Option 
B”, as in figure 2.3. 
For each of the fifteen pairs, the subjects have to choose between Option A and 
Option B. For monetary incentive purposes, at the end of the experiment, one line is 
randomly chosen and the subject is paid according to his/her choice. The payment is 
postponed until the end of the experiment to avoid a wealth effect. Subjects are also told 
that their decisions in this stage will not affect their possible earnings in the next stage of 
the experiment. 
In theory, and based on the experiment's results, the subjects will choose Option A 
for the first states and then, depending on their risk preference, at some point moving 
down the list they will switch to Option B. In a few cases subjects switched back and 
forth between Option A and Option B (10 out of 95 subjects of this experiment switched 
back and forth between these two options). 
The purpose of this stage is not to measure the CRRA coefficient, but to be able 
to rank the subjects depending on their risk preference from very risk-averse people to 
less risk-averse and risk-seeking individuals. The instructions do not mention anything 
about that, but based on their choices, at the end of stage one the subjects are separated in 
two different groups: more risk-averse and less risk-averse group. As other experiments 
have demonstrated, fewer than 50% of individuals are risk-seeking, no matter what risk 
elicitation method is used. Grouping the subjects in these two groups means that all of the 
risk-seeking people will be in the less risk-averse group. As a result there will be a 
contract zone for the group of more risk-averse subjects. By doing this, I am able to run 







different models of arbitration which states that the subjects should be risk-averse or risk-
neutral. If there are risk-seeking subjects in the model, the theory predicts that the 
contract zone can disappear (depending of the risk preferences of both subjects involved 
in the bargain) which will lead to a higher disagreement rate as Zeng (2006) showed. 
Zeng (2006) calculates the size of the contract zone for each of the following three types 
of arbitration CA, FOA, and α-FOA. The formulas are as follows: 
α-FOA : [  
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where: 
m – is the median of the distribution that describes the beliefs concerning the fair 
settlement of the arbitrator; 
σ2 - is the variance of the distribution that describes the beliefs concerning the fair 
settlement of the arbitrator; 
δ – is the CRRA coefficient of the disputants (for FOA, he assumes that both players 
have the same coefficient); 
C – is the cost of arbitration. 
Given these formulas, the length of the contract zone for each type of arbitration 
is: 
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From these formulas, it is apparent that with no cost for arbitration these values 
are positive if both players are risk-averse or risk-neutral. 
Giving the parameters from the experiment and assuming that the subjects are 
slightly risk-averse, the size of the contract zone for each type of arbitration is given in 
Table 2.1. As Zeng (2006) demonstrates, α-FOA has the largest contract zone, which 
should lead to a higher agreement rate than CA and FOA. 
The second stage of this experiment is a multi-treatment stage of bargaining using 
different types of arbitration in cases of disagreement. 
After the first stage, subjects are randomly assigned to a position of "seller" or 
"buyer" and are generically named Player A or Player B for the entire session. Then each 
Player A is randomly paired with a Player B from the same type of risk preference group. 
Each subject is randomly repaired after each period of the second stage in order to avoid 
any strategic effects. Subjects are required to bargain for the value of a variable X. The 
"sellers" are better off if the value of X is higher, while the "buyers" are better off if the 
value of X is smaller.  
They have a payoff table, similar to table 2.2, which shows them what the payoff 
is in US dollars for different values of X. Each subject is only able to observe his/her 
payoff table, which is the same for each "seller" and for each "buyer". The payoff 
functions that describes the relationship between the value of X and monetary payoff are 







The payoff function for buyers is:  
  ( )       (     )  (    )    [       ]                                       ( ) 
  The payoff function for sellers is: 
  ( )       (     )  (    )     [       ]                                       ( ) 
 In order to avoid a focal point at half of the pie, the sellers have the following 
suggestion range for X: [       ] . Buyers have the following suggestion range: 
[       ]. The pie is split in half for values of X equal to 500, which is not the half of 
these two intervals. 
There are 4 treatments and each treatment has 7 periods
1
 that consist of 1 minute 
bargaining periods. The treatment ordering was varied across sessions, as explained 
below. In the case of disagreements at the end of each period, an arbitration sub-stage is 
utilized. Each subject must submit a final offer. If a pair does not reach an agreement 
after the final offers are submitted, then an arbitration method is applied in order to 
decide how to split the pie. 
The cost for arbitration in my experiment is zero. One finding of Ashenfelter et al. 
(1992) is that dispute rates are inversely related to the cost of arbitration. While Deck et 
al. (2007) impose a cost for the disputants that do not reach an agreement by themselves, 
Dickinson (2004) does not have such cost. My experiment is similar to Dickinson (2004) 
in that I also choose not to have a cost, as imposing a cost for going to arbitration creates 
a bigger contract zone and also creates a contract zone in situations in which a contract 
zone would otherwise not exist. A situation like this arises when one disputant is risk-
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 For the last 4 sessions out of the total of 8, the treatment α-FOA had 10 periods instead of 7 and the 







neutral and the other is slightly a risk-seeker. Without the cost of arbitration, there is no 
contract zone in this situation. However, depending upon the size of the cost, the contract 
zone might still exist. The main idea of my paper is to have a contract zone only because 
of the risk preferences of the subjects, and not because of other factors. 
In the first treatment, called NA (no arbitration), if the subjects do not reach an 
agreement in the one minute timeframe or after they submit their final offers, the pie is 
destroyed and each subject gets $0. 
In the second treatment, called CA (conventional arbitration), if the subjects do 
not reach an agreement after one minute, they must submit a final offer. If the final offers 
converge, then the pie is split at the mean value between the final offers. If the final 
offers do not converge, a third party decides how to split the pie. The third party decision 
is made by randomly drawing from a (normal) distribution that was previously provided 
to the subjects. The value that is drawn will be the final outcome of arbitration. The 
subjects are informed about the distribution used through a table with 100 previous 
drawings. The table that provides the sample distribution was drawn using the same 
distribution that the computer uses during the experiment.  
The third treatment, FOA, uses final-offer arbitration in order to solve disputes. 
For this treatment, the computer draws a value from the same distribution function as in 
the previous treatment, and that value is what is considered the fair settlement value of 
the arbitrator. The subject that has the final offer closer to this value will "win" the 
dispute and the pie will be split according to his/her final offer.  
The last treatment, α-FOA, uses the Alpha-Final Offer Arbitration in order to 







for the subject that is further from the fair settlement value. In cases of disagreement after 
one minute of negotiation, the subjects have to submit their final offers. The computer 
draws a value from the same distribution function as in the previous treatments, and that 
value becomes the fair settlement value of the arbitrator. The subject that has a final offer 
closer to this value will win the arbitration. However, the value at which the pie will be 
split will not be the same as his/her final offer. The value of the final outcome will be 
equal to the fair settlement plus (minus) twice the difference between the fair settlement 
and the final offer of the other subject for the subject who is the seller (buyer). 
In each treatment, the value of the “fair settlement” of the third party will be a 
randomly draw from a normal distribution with the mean equal to 500 and the standard 
deviation equal to 30. This is the same distribution that Dickinson (2009) used in his 
experiment for the treatment with low variance. Using a small standard deviation I am 
able to control for some of the optimism of the subjects. Dickinson (2006) demonstrates 
that optimism has an important impact on subjects’ decisions in bargaining, but the goal 
of this paper is not to study optimism hence the necessity to control for it.  
Running an experiment at Purdue University during spring and fall semester of 
2012 I used 96 Purdue undergraduate students during 8 sessions of 12 students each. 
Each session lasted on average 1 hour and 45 minutes and the average payment was 
between $25 and $30 per subject in each session. The program used to run the experiment 
was Z-Tree proposed by Fischbacher (2007). All 4 treatments were used in each session, 
according to a Replicated Latin Square design. 
Hypothesis 1. The agreement rates for more risk-averse groups using α-FOA are 







The theoretical prediction for α-FOA states that if there are risk-averse or risk-
neutral individuals in the group, the subjects should be able to reach agreements all of the 
time. In Deck et al's (2007) paper, the agreement rates for AFOA do not meet this 
expectation, their agreement rates were significantly lower than 100%. One explanation 
for this is that the authors do not control for risk preferences and use risk-seeking subjects 
in their experiment. In contrast, my experiment will both control for risk preference, and 
utilize a greater value for α. Also by using a greater value for α my experiment imposes a 
larger punishment for the loser of arbitration, which should lead to higher agreement rates. 
Hypothesis 2. The agreement rates in α-FOA are higher than in CA or FOA. 
In cases of CA, there is no incentive to reach an agreement because the final 
decision does not depend on the subject’s offer, it only depends on what the third party 
believes is a “fair” settlement. For FOA, Brams et al (1983) demonstrate that the 
equilibrium strategies for the two parties will not converge on what they perceive as a 
“fair” settlement from the arbitrator. They use different types of distribution functions to 
describe the arbitrator’s notion of what a fair settlement is. So the theoretical predictions 
are that α-FOA should perform better than CA or FOA from the point of view of 
settlement rates. 
Hypothesis 3. The agreement rate in α-FOA for more risk-averse groups is higher 
than the agreement rate for less risk-averse groups. 
The theory shows that there is an inverse relationship between the size of the 
contract zone and the preference for risk: risk-seeking preferences imply lower contract 
zones or no contract zone. Zeng (2006) shares the same view as Farber et al. (1989) or 







agreement rates: lower contract zones, lower agreement rates. So the theoretical 
predictions are that for α-FOA the agreement rates should be higher for more risk-averse 
individuals than for less risk-averse people. 
3.4 Results 
Out of 96 subjects, I dropped one set of results from a single subject
2
.  
Result 1. On average the NA offers the highest total agreement rate of 72%, 
followed by α-FOA with 35%, CA with 27%, and FOA with 18%. 
Using an ANOVA type of analysis, the results show that there is no evidence of a 
difference between sessions, but there is an indication that differences in means due to 
order of the treatments exist. These differences are explained by the fact that the 4
th
 






 treatment of the session. 
However, there is a highly statistically significant difference in the means between the 
type of treatments. The output of the ANOVA analysis using SAS is presented in table 
2.4. A Tukey’s test of the ANOVA analysis shows that the mean for NA treatment is 
significantly different than the mean of any of the other treatments, and the means of α-
FOA and CA treatments are significantly different than the mean of the FOA treatment. 
These results regarding the agreement rates are consistent with Deck et al.'s (2007) 
results that NA treatment has the highest agreement rate, followed by the agreement rate 
for α-FOA (AFOA in Deck et al.’s (2007) study), CA agreement rate and FOA has the 
lowest agreement rate 
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 It seems that the student did not pay attention to the instructions and made offers of $-1. In addition, he 







A first observation is that contrary to the theoretical prediction, the α-FOA type of 
arbitration will not reach agreement rates close to 100%. Even when the less risk-averse 
group of subjects is removed, α-FOA had agreement rates equal to 34% for the more risk-
averse subjects.  
A non-parametric Wilcoxon Sum Rank exact one-sided test shows that there is a 
difference in means between NA treatment and the other treatments (p-value<0.001). The 
same test indicates that there is marginally statistically significant difference in means 
between α-FOA and CA (p-value=0.122), but there is a highly statistically significant 
difference in means between α-FOA and FOA (p-value=0.014). 
A session-specific random effect Probit model presented in the next table shows 
that there is a strong statistically significant difference in means between α-FOA and NA, 
and between α-FOA and FOA, and statistically significant difference in means between 
α-FOA and CA. Table 6 displays marginal effects from different models. The first model 
is a basic treatment effect model that has α-FOA as a base treatment. The next models 
include more explanatory variables in order to control for other factors that might affect 
the agreement rates like risk preferences and learning effect. All four models are 
consistent that the NA treatment will increase the agreement rates, while CA and FOA 
treatments will decrease the agreement rates comparing to α-FOA treatment. 
Risk is a binary variable that indicates if the pair of subjects is more risk-averse 
(risk=0) or if the pair of subjects is less risk-averse (risk=1). These values were attributed 
to each subject after they made their choice in the risk elicitation stage of the experiment 
and remained the same for the entire experiment. Period within treatment indicates the 







indicates if the session had the instructions modified and if α-FOA treatment had 10 
periods; Female/Male Ratio can take 3 values: 0 if both subjects of a pair are females, 0.5 
if one subject is female, one is male, and 1 if both subjects are males; Period within 
session is the number of the period within a session.  
Last treatment is a dummy variable that has value 1 when the treatment was the 
last treatment in a session. ANOVA results indicate that the 4
th
 treatment has higher mean 
than the other treatments.  The last two variables are two other metrics of the risk 
preferences of a pair of subjects: the average number of safe choices of a pair during the 
first stage of the experiment, and the average risk order within a session given the number 
of safe choices of the subjects that form a pair. 
When the treatment is the last treatment in the session increases the agreement 
rates, while variables related to risk preferences that should increase the agreements rate, 
will decrease the rate contrary to the theoretical prediction. 
The conclusion is that these results support hypothesis 2.  However, they do not 
support hypothesis 1. In order to determine why hypothesis 1 is not supported, I examine 
what factors lead subjects in the α-FOA treatment to submit a more aggressive final offer 
in the situation when they did not reach an agreement. Their final offer might depend on 
the subject’s characteristics, the number of the period within treatment or variables 
related to the outcome from the previous period. Table 7 shows a model in which the 
final offer of a subject that did not reach an agreement is the dependent variable, while 
the independent variables are some of the subject characteristics (risk preference, being 
buyer or seller, sex of the subject); a time variable (the number of the periods within the 







the subject reached an agreement or not, the outcome of the previous period, the value of 
the random draw in case of no agreement and the final offer of the counterpart in case of 
no agreement). 
The values of some variables that describe the outcome in the previous period 
(outcome, final offer, random draw) have different interpretations for a buyer or for a 
seller (i.e. a draw equal to 450 for a buyer means that the draw is in her favor, while for a 
seller it means that the draw is not in her favor). Therefor I calculate the distance between 
the value of these variables and the point X=500 (the mean of the fair settlement 
distribution). A positive distance means that the value of the variable is in her favor, 
while a negative value means that it is not in her favor (i.e. a draw/an outcome/a final 
offer of 450 has the distance of 50 units for a buyer, but -50 for a seller, while a draw/an 
outcome/a final offer of 530 has the distance of -30 units for a buyer and 30 for a seller). 
The first model in table 2.7 is an OLS model, while the second model is a time 
fixed effects model with clustered standard errors. Contrary to intuition and theoretical 
predictions, the only variable that has a coefficient that is statistically significant and 
increases the distance of the final offer from the median of the distribution function in the 
subject’s favor, making the agreement more difficult, is the variable Type which 
represents the type of the subject:  buyer or seller. The results from Table 7 indicate that a 
switch from seller to buyer will make the subject submit a more aggressive final offer by 
15 units. On average, a seller that did not reach an agreement made a final offer of 510, 
while a buyer that did not reach an agreement made an offer of 472. This result is not 
explained by the fact that the random draw might influence the buyers to be more 







these cases was equal to 500. Likewise there was no selection problem related to subjects’ 
risk preferences because the subjects were assigned randomly as a buyer or seller. Also 
the coefficients of the variables that control for the value of the past draw and the risk 
preference of the subjects are not statistically significant and they do not have a large 
effect on the final offer. Beliefs elicitation before subjects submit their final offer might 
help us understand why the subjects made such an offer. 
Another explanation why hypothesis 1 is not supported might be related to the 
mechanism itself. Even if α-FOA appears to be a relatively simple mechanism, the 
subjects might not understand that the value of the final outcome does not depend on 
their final offer and that their final offer determines only if they win or lose the arbitration.  
Beside the decision that the subjects had to take during the experiment in each of 
the two stages, the subjects had to answer to several quiz questions about the instructions. 
The questions were prior to the first stage, and before each treatment of the second stage. 
For the correctness of the answers, it is important to mention that there was no monetary 
incentive for subjects to give the best answer, the purpose of these questions is to help 
them understand the instructions better. 
The first stage had 3 quiz questions. For the first question 75% of the subjects 
gave the correct answer, for the second question 96% and for the last one 98%. Only one 
subject switched back and forth between Option A and Option B, out of all subjects that 
gave at least one wrong answer. For CA and FOA treatments there was just one question 
per treatment and the percentages of correct answers were 81.3% and 92.7%, respectively. 







treatment the percentage of correct answers was at the same level as the other two 
treatments: 72.9% for the first question and 96.9% for the second question.  
However for the α-FOA the percentage of the correct answers dropped to 21.9% 
for the first question and 36.5% for the second question. Given that they did not have any 
monetary incentive to try to calculate the exact value, I calculate the percentage of 
students that gave an approximate answer (that means that they understood which player 
from their example won the arbitration and they chose a value close to the correct 
answer). In that case, the percentage of an approximate answer is 76.0% for the first 
question and 69.8% for the second question. Given these results, my suggestion is that 
the subjects did not totally understand how this arbitration mechanism works. 
A stage that will elicit subjects’ beliefs before they submit their final offers might 
offer insights regarding if they understood the mechanism and also regarding their 
optimism about the random draw, a factor that Dickinson (2009) shows that affects the 
outcome of the arbitration. 
Result 2. Agreement rate after the subjects submit their final offers for α-FOA 
treatment is statistically different than the mean for CA or FOA treatments. 
This result does not concern the main research questions of this paper and is 
related to the moment in time when the subjects reached an agreement during the 
arbitration procedure. The subjects were able to reach an agreement during the two 
different stages of arbitration. The first stage is the negotiation stage before the subjects 
submitted their final offers, and they can reach an agreement by accepting the last offer 







submitted their final offers, in cases where their final offers crossed-over. In other words 
they were able to reach an agreement before or after they submitted their final offers. 
A Wilcoxon Sum Rank exact one-sided test shows that the mean for agreement 
rates after the subjects submitted their final offers for α-FOA is strongly statistically 
different than the mean for CA (p-value=0.0023) and the mean for FOA (p-value<0.001). 
Moreover, the agreement rate after the final offers were submitted for FOA is almost zero. 
On the other hand there is no difference in mean between agreement rates before the 
subjects submitted the final offer for α-FOA and FOA (p-value=0.3281), and there is a 
statistically significant difference in the means between agreement rates for α-FOA and 
CA (p-value=0.0079). This might imply that during the negotiation the subjects behave 
almost the same no matter what arbitration procedure is applied, but once they have to 
submit their final offers, they are more willing to reach an agreement under α-FOA. So α-
FOA offers more incentives to reach an agreement as theory predicts but these incentives 
are not strong enough during negotiation process, but become stronger once the subjects 
have to submit their final offers. 
Result 3. More risk-averse groups of subjects do not have higher agreement rates 
than less risk-averse groups of subjects. 
The distribution of subjects by the number of safe choices from the first stage of 
the experiment is shown in Figure 2.6 for the two groups of subjects. 
On average the more risk-averse subjects choose 10.28 safe choices while the less 
risk-averse subjects choose 7.02 safe choices. The graph below and the means show that 
most of the subjects are risk-averse. Due to the settings of the risk elicitation method, a 







Given subjects’ choices during the risk elicitation stage, I calculate if a contract 
zone exists for each pair in each period. For the four sessions from spring of 2012 there 
were 4.5% cases in which there was no contract zone. All these cases were for the less 
risk-averse group of subjects. However, for the four sessions from fall 2012 this 
percentage was significantly higher: 20.3%. This high percentage is mainly due to subject 
11 from session 7 and subject 10 of session 8, who may  not have correctly understood  
the task from the risk elicitation stage. Both subjects chose only the risky option even for 
the cases in which the risky option earned  them $0 with certainty,  compared to $1 from 
the safe option (they chose option B even for line 1 from figure 2.3). Due to their choices, 
there is no contract zone for any  pair which included one of them. Without taking into 
account their cases,  12% of cases resulted in no  contract zone for the last four sessions. 
While theory predicts  that, due to the lack of a contract zone, the more risk-
averse group of subjects should have a higher agreement rate than the less risk-averse 
group of subjects, the results do not support this prediction. 
The same non-parametric test shows that there is a difference in the means of the 
agreements rates between more risk-averse groups of subjects and less risk-averse groups 
of students for CA (p-values=0.0149) and FOA (p-values=0.0618) types of arbitration. 
The agreement rate for more risk-averse group of subjects is smaller than the agreement 
rate for the less risk-averse group of subjects. For the α-FOA type of arbitration there is 
just a marginally significant difference in means, p-values=0.1048, while for the NA 
treatment there is no difference in means for the agreement rates between more risk-







This result is consistent with the Probit models from columns 3 and 4 from Table 
2.6. In both models, the coefficient for the variable that measures the risk preference of a 
pair of subjects is negative and statistically significant. Because the value for both 
variables increases when a pair is more risk-averse, the coefficient indicates that the 
agreement rate will decrease when a pair of subjects is more risk-averse. 
This result is contrary to the theoretical prediction that implies that more risk-
averse people should reach an agreement more frequently than less risk-averse people. 
These results fail to support hypothesis 3.  
One explanation why hypothesis 3 is not supported might be the method used for 
risk elicitation. As discussed above in section 2, papers have shown that the distribution 
of risk preferences can be quite different even for the same type of task when using 
different methods. A new method using arbitration in order to elicit risk preferences 
might be more appropriate. Another explanation is optimism. Even though the design of 
my experiment tried to control for optimism by using a small standard deviation for the 
normal distribution that describes the notion of the fair settlement of the arbitrator, the 
subjects can still be biased by the median of this distribution, which leads to disputes. A 
solution to this problem would be to elicit their beliefs about the draw of the value for the 
fair settlement, similar to Dickinson (2009), and to see if the subjects were biased or if 
they were just aggressive in negotiations. 
Another way to investigate the problem of risk preferences in arbitration 
mechanisms is to take a similar approach to Brunner et al. (2013). Brunner et al. (2013) 
study the effect of  risk preferences in English premium auctions. They asked 368 







website. Out of the 368 subjects, 48 observations were discarded because they were 
incomplete or inconsistent. Due the low number of risk-seeking subjects from the rest 
320 subjects they used only 40 subjects for the main experiment. The subjects were then 
classified as risk-averse (with 7, 8 or 9 safe choices out of 10) or as risk-seeking (0-3 safe 
choices). With a design similar to that the theoretical prediction is that the contract zone 
does not exist for any pair of the risk-seeking group of subjects while it exits for all pairs 
of the risk-averse group of subjects. The only problem with this approach is the high cost 
of the risk elicitation stage. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Starting with Stevens (1966) a few arbitration mechanisms were proposed instead 
of CA, mechanisms that should improve agreement rates, but most of them did not reach 
higher agreement rates compared to CA, in practice or in lab experiments. A promising 
arbitration mechanism that offers marginally higher agreement rates compared to CA is 
AFOA proposed by Zeng (2003). In their experimental study, Deck et al. (2007) show 
that the agreement rate for AFOA is strictly higher than the agreement rate for FOA and 
weakly higher than the one for CA. 
In this paper, I study a more general case of AFOA proposed by Zeng (2003) 
called α-FOA and also take into account the risk preferences of the subjects due to the 
fact that the existence of the contract zone depends on the risk preferences of the subjects. 
α-FOA is similar to a “second-price” auction in the sense that the value of the subject’s 
final offer determines only if she wins the arbitration, but the value of the outcome of the 
arbitration depends on the value of the final offer of her counterpart. Due to this property, 







arbitration and to obtain a favorable outcome after the arbitration. Compared to AFOA 
that offers the same property, α-FOA allows for changes in the punishment of a subject 
that is aggressive with her final offer in order to create stronger incentives to reach an 
agreement. With regard to the contract zone, α-FOA offers the largest contract zone for 
risk-neutral and risk-averse subjects compared to the other arbitration methods. 
The experiment of this study is similar to the experiment of Dickinson (2004). 
Subjects are randomly assigned the role of a buyer or seller and each buyer is randomly 
paired each period with a seller. For each round, they have to agree upon the value of a 
variable X, a variable that offers high payoffs when it takes low values for buyers and 
high payoffs when it takes high values for sellers. If subjects do not reach an agreement 
in a one minute period, they have to submit their final offers. If these final offers do not 
cross-over to indicate an agreement, one of the arbitration mechanisms is applied in order 
to determine the outcome of that round. In addition, at the beginning of a session I elicit 
the subjects’ risk preferences and split them into two groups, more risk-averse and less 
risk-averse, in order to have in the more risk-averse group of subjects only risk-neutral 
and risk-averse subjects and guarantee the existence of a contract zone. 
The results of the experiment show that α-FOA has on average a higher 
agreement rate than CA or FOA. A non-parametric test shows that the agreement rate for 
α-FOA is statistically significantly greater than the agreement rate for FOA and weakly 
statistically significantly greater than the agreement rate for CA. A session-specific 
random effect Probit model shows that there is a strong statistically significant difference 







between α-FOA and CA. Contrary to the theoretical prediction risk preferences have the 
opposite impact on the agreement rates for these arbitration mechanisms.  
Despite the fact that α-FOA looks really promising in a laboratory experiment 
environment, future research should focus on finding an answer that will explain the 
difference in agreement rates between the theoretical prediction and the results obtain in a 
laboratory experiment. Also, I suggest that future studies of arbitration mechanisms 








Andreoni, J. and W.T. Harbaugh, 2009. “Unexpected utility: experimental tests of five 
key questions about preferences over risk.” Working Paper 
Ashenfelter, O., J. Currie, H.S. Farber and M. Spiegel, 1992. “An experimental 
comparison of dispute rates in alternative arbitration systems” Econometrica, Vol. 
60, pp. 1407–1433 
Babcock, L., G. Loewenstein, S. Issacharoff and C Camerer, 1995. “Biased judgments of 
fairness in bargaining.” American Economic Review, Vol. 85, pp. 1337–1343. 
Bolton, G. E., and E. Katok, 1998. “Reinterpreting arbitration’s narcotic effect: An 
experimental study of learning in repeated bargaining” Games and Economic 
Behavior, Vol. 25, pp. 1–33 
Brams, S. J. and S. Merrill III, 1983. “Equilibrium strategies for final-offer arbitration: 
there is no median convergence” Management Science, Vol. 29, pp. 927–941 
Brams, S.J. and S. Merrill III, 1986. “Binding versus Final-Offer Arbitration: a 
combination is best” Management Science, Vol. 32, No. 10, pp. 1346-1355 
Brunner, C., A. Hu and J. Oechssler 2013. “Premium auction and risk preferences” 
Working Paper 
Dave, C., C.C. Eckel, C.A. Johnson and C. Rojas, 2010. “Eliciting risk preferences: 
When is simple better?” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 41, pp. 219-243 
Deck, C., A. Farmer and D.-Z. Zeng, 2007. “Amended final-offer arbitration over an 
uncertain value: A comparison with CA and FOA” Experimental Economics, Vol. 
10, pp. 439-454 
Deck, C.,and A. Farmer, 2007b. “Bargaining over an uncertain value: Arbitration 
mechanisms compared” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 23, 
pp. 547-579 
Dickinson, D. L., 2003. “Illustrated examples of the effects of risk preferences and 
expectations on bargaining outcomes” The Journal of Economic Education, Vol. 
54, No. 2, pp. 169–180 
Dickinson, D. L., 2004. “A comparison of conventional, final-offer, and ‘Combined’ 
arbitration for dispute resolution” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 57, 
pp. 288–301 
Dickinson, D. L., 2005. “Bargaining outcomes with double-offer arbitration” 







Dickinson, D.L., 2006. “The chilling effect of optimism: the case of final-offer arbitration” 
Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 35, pp. 17–30. 
Dickinson, D. L., 2009. “The effects of beliefs versus risk preferences on bargaining 
outcomes” Theory and Decision, Vol. 66, pp. 69–101 
Dulleck, U., J. Fell and J. Fooken, 2011. “Within-subject Intra- and Inter-method 
consistency of two experimental risk attitude elicitation methods” Working Paper 
Eckel, C.C. and P.J. Grossman, 2008. “Forecasting risk attitudes: an experimental study 
using actual and forecast gamble choices” Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, Vol. 68, pp. 1–17. 
Farber, H. S., and M. H. Bazerman, 1989. “Divergent expectations as a cause of 
disagreement in bargaining: evidence from a comparison of arbitration schemes” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 104, pp. 99–120. 
Fischbacher, U., 2007. “z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments” 
Experimental Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 171–178 
Holt, C.A. and S.K. Laury, 2002. “Risk aversion and incentive effects” American 
Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 5, pp. 1644–1655. 
Holt, C.A. and S.K. Laury, 2005. “Risk aversion and incentive effects: new data without 
order effects” American Economic Review, Vol. 95, No. 3, pp. 902–904. 
Stevens, C. M., 1966. “Is compulsory arbitration compatible with bargaining?” Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 5, pp. 38–52 
Vickrey, W., 1961. “Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders” The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 8-37 
Zeng, D-Z., S. Nakamura and T. Ibaraki, 1996. “Double Offer Arbitration” Mathematical 
Social Sciences, Vol. 31, pp. 147–170 
Zeng, D.-Z., 2003. “An amendment to final-offer arbitration” Mathematical Social 
Sciences, Vol. 46, pp. 9–19 
Zeng, D.-Z., 2006. “How powerful is arbitration procedure AFOA?” International 


















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Period number within a treatment 























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Period number within a treatment 





































Number of safe choices 






















1 3 5 7 1 3 5 7 1 3 5 7 1 3 5 7 9
Period number within a treatment 
Agreement rates for more and less risk averse  











Table 3.1 Size of the contract zone 












α-FOA 500 30 0.1 0.1 0 2 365.0 635.0 270.0 67.5% 
CA 500 30 0.1 0.1 0 - 455.0 545.0 90.0 22.5% 







Table 3.2 The payoff tables for player A and player B 





300 $0.00 200 $2.50 
350 $0.25 250 $2.25 
400 $0.50 300 $2.00 
450 $0.75 350 $1.75 
500 $1.00 400 $1.50 
550 $1.25 450 $1.25 
600 $1.50 500 $1.00 
650 $1.75 550 $0.75 
700 $2.00 600 $0.50 
750 $2.25 650 $0.25 







Table 3.3 The order of treatments in each session according to Latin Square design 
    Session number 




1st CA FOA α-FOA NA 
2nd FOA α-FOA NA CA 
3rd α-FOA NA CA FOA 







Table 3.4 ANOVA output 
Source DF Type III SS Mean Square F Value Pr> F 
Treatment 3 12710.375 4236.791 46.95 <.0001 
Session 6 987.875 164.645 1.82 0.1507 












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
NA 69% 60% 69% 74% 83% 90% 76% 55% 
CA 12% 34% 24% 31% 19% 12% 50% 36% 
FOA 7% 6% 29% 19% 10% 14% 31% 24% 







Table 3.6 Marginal effects - Random Effect Probit models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Agreements Agreements Agreements Agreements 
     
No Arbitration 0.390*** 0.394*** 0.397*** 0.394*** 
(dummy) 
 
(0.0369) (0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0372) 
Conventional Arb. -0.0718* -0.0701* -0.0713* -0.0703* 
(dummy) 
 
(0.0372) (0.0376) (0.0377) (0.0376) 
Final-Offer Arb. -0.183*** -0.187*** -0.189*** -0.187*** 
(dummy) 
 
(0.0355) (0.0355) (0.0355) (0.0355) 
Risk Preferences Group  0.0444   
(dummy) 
 
 (0.0284)   
Period within treatment  0.00431 0.00432 0.00427 
 
 
 (0.00764) (0.00766) (0.00764) 
Spring-Fall Experiment  0.0687 0.0459 0.0672 
(dummy) 
 
 (0.0482) (0.0469) (0.0485) 
Female/Male Ratio  -0.0372 -0.0714 -0.0420 
 
 
 (0.0457) (0.0465) (0.0458) 
Period within session  -0.000800 -0.000681 -0.000743 
 
 
 (0.00272) (0.00273) (0.00272) 
Last treatment  0.153*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 
(dummy)  (0.0534) (0.0536) (0.0534) 
     
Average number of safe    -0.0303***  
choices 
 
  (0.00707)  
Average risk order within    -0.0102** 
a session    (0.00444) 
     
Observations 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 
Number of Session 8 8 8 8 
Standard errors in parentheses 







Table 3.7 OLS model and time fixed effect model estimates 
 (1) (2) 
 Distance from 500 Distance from 500 
VARIABLES of the final offer of the final offer 
   
Risk preferences group -2.438 -1.857 
(dummy) (3.151) (2.889) 
 
Type – Seller/Buyer  15.60*** 14.72*** 
(dummy ; Buyer=1) (3.286) (2.976) 
 
Period within treatment -2.054*** -1.462** 
 (0.687) (0.714) 
 
Female/Male -0.883 -2.343 
(dummy ; Male=1) (3.215) (4.542) 
 
Agreement in t-1 -3.717 -5.758 
 (4.048) (3.465) 
 
Dist. of the draw in t-1 0.140* 0.128 
 (0.0729) (0.0916) 
 
Dist. of the outcome t-1 -0.0406** -0.0369 
 (0.0176) (0.0295) 
 
Dist. of the counterpart -0.0349 -0.0767 
offer in t-1 (0.0516) (0.0609) 
 
Constant 9.086 8.762* 
 (7.286) (5.003) 
   
Observations 391 391 
R-squared 0.130 0.138 
 
Time fixed effects NO YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Experiment Instructions (first stage) 
This is an experiment in decision-making. Please read the following instructions carefully. 
The amount of money that you earn in this experiment will depend on your decisions. 
 
Your screen will show 15 lines with a choice each, between two options: A and B. The 




Each decision is a paired choice between "Option A" and "Option B." You will 
make 15 choices and record these in the final column, but only one of them will be used 
in the end to determine your earnings. Before you start making your 15 choices, please let 





There is a bingo cage containing 15 balls (for the first draw) and 20 balls (for the 
second draw). The balls have a number from 1 to 15, and 1 to 20 respectively. At the end 
of the experiment there will be two drawings, the first to select one of the 15 decisions to 
be used, and a second one to determine what your payoff is if you chose option B for that 
decision. Even though you will make 15 decisions, only one of these will end up 
affecting your earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision will be used. 
Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being used in the end. 
 
For example, please look at Decision 5 (Line 5). Option A pays $1 for sure. 
Option B pays $3 if the second ball is 1,2,3 or 4, and $0 if the second ball is 5,6,7…,20. 
The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of 
the higher payoff for option B increase.  
 
To summarize, you will make 15 choices: for each decision row you will have to 
choose between Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some decision rows and 
B for other rows, and you may change your decisions and make them in any order. When 
you are finished, click the “Submit” button. After you click the “Submit” button, you will 
not be able to change your choices. At the end of the experiment, we will use a bingo 
cage to determine what decision we will use for your payment and what your payoff is if 
you chose Option B for that particular decision. 
 
Before you start to make your decisions, you will have to answer to couple of quiz 
questions about these instructions. The answers for these questions will NOT affect your 
earnings at all and they are just to be sure that you understood the instructions.  
 
Are there any questions? Please do not talk with anyone while we are doing this. 
If you have any questions before starting and during the experiment, please raise your 






Instructions (second stage) 
You have been randomly assigned as Player B (Player A) for the remainder of 
this experiment. You will have a new randomly chosen counterpart Player A (Player B), 
for following of the next periods. You and your counterpart will be given 1 minute in a 
decision-making period to mutually agree upon the size of a variable, X. The time will be 
displayed in the upper right hand corner of your screen.  
 
Your range of possible X values lies from 200 to 700 (300 to 800) in increments 
of one (this may not be the same range as that of your counterpart). The value of X at the 
end of the period will determine your cash earnings for that period.  
For a Player A, the cash earnings for any given period are larger for larger values 
of X. For a Player B, the cash earnings for any given period are larger for smaller values 
of X. 
 
The payoff table below translates the different values of X into earnings in US 
dollars. Please study this payoff table carefully so that you fully understand how your 
earnings will vary given the different possible values of X. 
 





300 $0.00 200 $2.50 
350 $0.25 250 $2.25 
400 $0.50 300 $2.00 
450 $0.75 350 $1.75 
500 $1.00 400 $1.50 
550 $1.25 450 $1.25 
600 $1.50 500 $1.00 
650 $1.75 550 $0.75 
700 $2.00 600 $0.50 
750 $2.25 650 $0.25 
800 $2.50 700 $0.00 
All integer values for X are possible, and those not shown in the table provide 




If you and your counterpart mutually agree upon the size of X for that period, then 
your payoff table indicates how much you will earn for that period. In a few moments we 
will discuss what will happen should you and your counterpart not be able to come to an 
agreement by the end of the allocated time. Your interaction with your counterpart will 
only occur through the computers. You will never know the identity of your counterpart 
and your counterpart will never know your identity.  
The next screen shows the environment in which you will interact with your 
counterpart. In your interactions with your counterpart, you will submit your proposal for 





To enter a proposal for X, in the “New Offer” box, enter a value for X and then 
click “New offer” button. Your offer will be displayed in the middle box, called “My 




displayed also in the same order for your counterpart, in his/her third box (from left to 
right) called “Counterpart’s offer”. The offers that your counterpart makes to you will be 
displayed in your box “Counterpart’s offer”. At any time you can choose only the last 
offer (offers at the top of the list) that your counterpart made by clicking on that offer and 
then the button “Accept”. If he/she makes a new offer you will not be able to accept the 
previous one. The same rule is valid for your counterpart. He/she will be able to accept 
only the last offer that you made. Offers can be updated at any time, but it may be wise to 





If you choose to accept your counterpart’s offer, a confirmation window will pop 
out and ask you to confirm your acceptance of this offer. If you click the “No” button 
then the offer is not accepted and you can continue to make and receive offers. If you 
click the “Yes” button, the offer is accepted and a screen with the final result and the 




time between when you click the “Accept” button and the “Yes” button for confirmation, 
and you counterpart makes a new offer in the meantime, then you will not be able to 
accept this offer, even if you click “Yes” button on the confirmation window. As 
mentioned above, you are able to accept only the last offer made.  
Once the period is over, either another period of similar interactions will occur, or 
new instructions will follow for the subsequent period(s). At the end of every period you 
should write down the information shown on your results screen on your Personal Record 
Sheet, then click the “OK” button. 
 
 
The computer will keep track of your cumulative experimental earnings and 
display them on your screen at the end of each period. You will also have a timer on the 
screen showing you how much time is left in a particular period. Please take a moment to 
locate these items on your screen. The instructions will inform you what will happen in 







For the next several periods, the following procedure is used if you and your 
counterpart do not reach an agreement by the end of the period. Should you reach the end 
of the period without having mutually agreed upon a value for X, you will then be 
prompted for a final offer. If your and your counterpart’s final offers are equal, then that 
is the value of X for the period. If they cross (i.e. Player A’s offer is smaller than Player 
B’s offer), then X will be the average of these final offers. If there is still no agreement 
(i.e. Player A’s offer is greater than player B’s offer), then you will both receive $0 for 
that period. This does not affect any of your previous earnings, nor does it apply to future 
earnings (future periods of the experiment). It is important for you to understand this rule. 
Before you start the decision-making periods regarding value of X, you will have 
to answer to couple of quiz questions about these instructions. The answers for these 
questions will NOT affect your earnings and they are just to be sure that you understood 
the instructions.  
This procedure for addressing situations with no agreement at the end of the 
period will continue until you are otherwise notified. If you have any questions before 









                    
Your final offer 
                    
Agreement (Yes/No) 
                    
Counterpart final 
offer                     
Result of the period 
                    
Earnings this period 
                    
Total profit 





For the next several periods, the following procedure is used if you and your 
counterpart do not reach an agreement by the end of the period. Should you reach the end 
of the period without having mutually agreed upon a value for X, you will then be 
prompted for a final offer. If your and your counterpart’s final offers are equal, then that 
is the value of X for the period. If they cross (i.e. Player A’s offer is smaller than Player 
B’s offer), then X will be the average of these final offers. If there is still no agreement, 
the computer will use a value, let’s call it Y, for you and your counterpart. This value Y 
will determine what value of X will be chosen for that period. Some values of Y are more 
likely to be chosen than others, but there is a random element to the computer’s choice. 
Whatever the value of Y the computer randomly chooses, that will also be the value of 
X used to determine both your and your counterpart’s payoffs for that period.  
 
Example :  
 
 
To give you some information about this random number generation procedure, 
the next table shows you 100 values of Y using the exact same method that will be used 
in your case. The order of these 100 values of Y is irrelevant. 
Again, if you and your counterpart have not reached an agreement by the end of 
the period, you will be prompted for a final offer. If your final offers still do not indicate 
an agreement (i.e. Player A’s offer is greater than player B’s offer), then the same random 
number generation procedure that chose these 100 values of Y will be used to determine 





100 random draws of Y 
461 494 531 543 499 546 503 458 521 506 
487 496 522 510 495 477 455 457 525 498 
510 545 491 477 519 511 478 515 493 442 
607 542 509 541 533 493 468 495 506 487 
583 543 476 449 533 534 571 494 465 446 
460 520 527 497 474 467 482 543 466 525 
591 464 466 493 502 501 522 509 503 473 
522 522 468 510 464 517 494 506 522 503 
498 549 476 509 467 533 527 548 578 484 
521 515 412 474 500 546 477 476 480 509 
 
Before you start the decision-making periods regarding value of X, you will have 
to answer to couple of quiz questions about these instructions. The answers for these 
questions will NOT affect your earnings and they are just to be sure that you understood 
the instructions.  
This procedure for addressing situations with no agreement at the end of the 
period will continue until you are otherwise notified. If you have any questions before 








Personal Record Sheet 
 
Period 
                    
Your final offer 
                    
Agreement (Yes/No) 
                    
Counterpart final 
offer                     
Result of the period 
                    
Earnings this period 
                    
Total profit 





For the next several periods, the following procedure is used if you and your 
counterpart do not reach an agreement by the end of the period. Should you reach the end 
of the period without having mutually agreed upon a value for X, you will then be 
prompted for a final offer. If your and your counterpart’s final offers are equal, then that 
is the value of X for the period. If they cross (i.e. Player A’s offer is smaller than Player 
B’s offer), then X will be the average of these final offers. If there is still no agreement, 
the computer will use a value, let’s call it Y, for you and your counterpart. This value Y 
will determine what value of X will be chosen for that period. Some values of Y are more 
likely to be chosen than others, but there is a random element to the computer’s choice. 
Whichever person’s final offer is closer to the value Y will be chosen as the final 
outcome for X, used to both you and your counterpart payoff for that period.  
 
Example 1: 
Assume that Player A’s final offer was 30, Player B’s final offer was 20 and Y=22. 
Player B’s offer is closer to the value Y than Player A’s offer. Therefore the value for X 




Assume that Player A’s last offer was 30, Player B’s last offer was 20 and Y=26. Player 
A’s offer is closer to the value Y than Player B’s offer. Therefore the value for X for this 






To give you some information about this random number generation procedure, 
the table below shows you 100 values of Y using the exact same method that will be used 
in your case. The order of these 100 values of Y is irrelevant. 
 
100 random draws of Y 
461 494 531 543 499 546 503 458 521 506 
487 496 522 510 495 477 455 457 525 498 
510 545 491 477 519 511 478 515 493 442 
607 542 509 541 533 493 468 495 506 487 
583 543 476 449 533 534 571 494 465 446 
460 520 527 497 474 467 482 543 466 525 
591 464 466 493 502 501 522 509 503 473 
522 522 468 510 464 517 494 506 522 503 
498 549 476 509 467 533 527 548 578 484 
521 515 412 474 500 546 477 476 480 509 
 
Again, if you and your counterpart have not reached an agreement by the end of 
the period, you will be prompted for a final offer. If your final offers still do not indicate 
an agreement (i.e. Player A’s offer is greater than player B’s offer), then the same random 
number generation procedure that chose these 100 values of Y will be used to determine 
your value of X for that period.  
Before you start the decision-making periods regarding value of X, you will have 
to answer to couple of quiz questions about these instructions. The answers for these 
questions will NOT affect your earnings and they are just to be sure that you understood 




This procedure for addressing situations with no agreement at the end of the 
period will continue until you are otherwise notified. If you have any questions before 










                    
Your final offer 
                    
Agreement (Yes/No) 
                    
Counterpart final 
offer                     
Result of the period 
                    
Earnings this period 
                    
Total profit 






For the next several periods, the following procedure is used if you and your 
counterpart do not reach an agreement by the end of the period. Should you reach the end 
of the period without having mutually agreed upon a value for X, you will then be 
prompted for a final offer. If your and your counterpart’s final offers are equal, then that 
is the value of X for the period. If they cross (i.e. Player A’s offer is smaller than Player 
B’s offer), then X will be the average of these final offers. If there is still no agreement, 
the computer will use a value, let’s call it Y, for you and your counterpart. This value Y 
will determine what value of X will be chosen for that period. Some values of Y are more 
likely to be chosen than others, but there is a random element to the computer’s choice. 
The result for X for that period will be: 
 
- if Player B’s offer is closer to the value of Y: X will be equal to the value of Y 
minus twice the difference between Player A’s offer and the value of Y. 
 
- if Player A’s offer is closer to the value Y: X will be equal to the value of Y 
plus twice the difference between the value of Y and Player B’s offer. 
 
In other words, the value of X will be even more favorable to an individual than her 
last offer, if that person has a final offer closer to the value of Y than her counterpart. 
Example 1: 
Assume that Player A’s last offer was 30, Player B’s last offer was 20 and Y=22. Player 
B’s offer is closer to the value of Y than Player A’s offer. Then the value for X for this 
period will be equal to the value of Y minus twice the difference between Player A’s 








Assume that Player A’s last offer was 30, Player B’s last offer was 20 and Y=26. Player 
A’s offer is closer to the value of Y than Player B’s offer. Then the value for X for this 
period will be equal to the value of Y plus twice the difference between the value of Y 





To give you some information about this random number generation procedure, 
the next table shows you 100 values of Y using the exact same method that will be used 
in your case. The order of these 100 values of Y is irrelevant. 
Again, if you and your counterpart have not reached an agreement by the end of 
the period, you will be prompted for a final offer. If your final offers still do not indicate 
an agreement (i.e. Player A’s offer is greater than player B’s offer), then the same random 
number generation procedure that chose these 100 values of Y will be used to determine 







100 random draws of Y 
461 494 531 543 499 546 503 458 521 506 
487 496 522 510 495 477 455 457 525 498 
510 545 491 477 519 511 478 515 493 442 
607 542 509 541 533 493 468 495 506 487 
583 543 476 449 533 534 571 494 465 446 
460 520 527 497 474 467 482 543 466 525 
591 464 466 493 502 501 522 509 503 473 
522 522 468 510 464 517 494 506 522 503 
498 549 476 509 467 533 527 548 578 484 
521 515 412 474 500 546 477 476 480 509 
 
Before you start the decision-making periods regarding value of X, you will have 
to answer to couple of quiz questions about these instructions. The answers for these 
questions will NOT affect your earnings and they are just to be sure that you understood 
the instructions.  
This procedure for addressing situations with no agreement at the end of the 
period will continue until you are otherwise notified. If you have any questions before 
















                    
Your final offer 
                    
Agreement (Yes/No) 
                    
Counterpart final 
offer                     
Result of the period 
                    
Earnings this period 
                    
Total profit 
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CHAPTER 4.  FAIRNESS AND ARBITRATION MECHANISMS 
4.1 Introduction 
In this paper I present a model of an arbitration mechanism that includes 
inequality aversion between disputants. Previous theoretical models show that for 
different arbitration mechanisms, two risk-neutral disputants with identical beliefs about 
the choice of the arbitrator as a fair settlement will reach an agreement. In my model, if 
the two disputants are  inequality-averse, as in Fehr & Schmidt (1999), and if they have 
optimistically biased beliefs about the size of the pie that they try to split, they will not 
reach an agreement. Thus, inequality aversion might explain the low agreement rates 
observed in laboratory experiments for different arbitration mechanisms. 
In the literature on arbitration mechanisms there are different explanations as to 
why mechanisms that are designed to help two disputants reach an agreement do not 
always reach their goal. Stevens (1966) says the Conventional Arbitration (CA) gives the 
two disputants the incentive to make final offers that diverge instead of converge because 
the arbitrator usually splits in two the difference between these final offers. To eliminate 
this incentive, Stevens (1966) proposes Final Offer Arbitration (FOA). Ashenfelter at al. 
(1992) conduct a laboratory experiment and show that FOA has lower agreement rates 
than CA. Brams and Merrill (1983) show for FOA that if the two disputants are risk- 
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neutral and the fair settlement of the arbitrator is a random draw from a known 
distribution function, the final offers do not converge to an agreement and thus the two 
disputants do not reach an agreement by themselves. Brams and Merrill (1983) show for 
different distribution functions that the final offers are almost two standard deviations 
apart. As a conclusion, Brams and Merrill (1986) propose Combined Arbitration 
(CombA), which is a combination between CA and FOA. The theoretical prediction for 
this arbitration mechanism is that if the two disputants are risk-neutral, the final offers 
converge to the median of the distribution function that describes the beliefs about the 
fair settlement of the arbitrator. Other arbitration mechanisms, such as Double-Offer 
Arbitration (DOA) proposed by Zeng et al. (1996) and Amended Final Offer Arbitration 
(AFOA) proposed by Zeng (2003) have a similar theoretical prediction. Zeng (2003) also 
proposes a more general case of AFOA called Alpha-Final Offer Arbitration (α-FOA). 
To my knowledge these new mechanisms have not been applied in the field, but 
laboratory experiments such as the one described in Chapter 2 and other studies 
(Dickinson (2004), Dickinson (2005), Deck et al. (2007)) show that the agreement rate is 
much lower than the predicted one. An explanation for this lower agreement rate is that 
the models assume that the disputants are risk-neutral and that they have identical 
expectations about the arbitrator’s choice of the fair settlement. Dickinson (2003) shows 
how the existence and the size of the contract zone (the region of outcomes that is 
mutually preferred to arbitration with certainty by disputants) depends on the risk 
preferences of the disputants and on their beliefs about the choice of the fair settlement of 
the arbitrator. Dickinson (2003) also shows that the disputants might fail to  reach an 
agreement because of these two factors. Dickinson (2009) conducts a laboratory 
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experiment to study the effect of these two factors and concludes that both of them can 
decrease the agreement rate. 
The Chapter 3 experimental paper ranks the subjects on their risk preferences in 
order to avoid situations in which the contract zone does not exist, and in which there is 
thus no agreement between disputants. The variance of the distribution function that 
describes the arbitrator’s fair settlement is low in this experiment in order to induce 
disputants to have identical beliefs about the arbitrator’s choice of a fair settlement. But 
even controlling for these two factors, the agreements rate for α-FOA is very low for the 
more risk-averse group of subjects compared to the theoretical prediction: around 35% 
instead of 100%. 
In most experimental studies there is also a treatment called No Arbitration that 
does not involve arbitration and in which the disputants receive a payoff of $0 if they do 
not reach an agreement by themselves. The theoretical prediction is that the disputants 
should reach an agreement 100% of the time, and that they should accept any offer made 
by their counterpart. However, even for this treatment, which  does not involve risk or an 
arbitrator and beliefs about her choices of a fair settlement, the agreement rate is still 
lower than predicted. In this study, as in most previous experimental studies, the 
agreement rate is around 75%. This indicates that in addition to factors such as type of 
arbitration, risk preferences of the disputants or their beliefs about the arbitrator’s choice 
of a fair settlement, there are also other factors that influence the outcome of the dispute. 
Results from other bargaining games, like an ultimatum game, have similar 
deviation from predictions of the standard model. Different papers like Fehr & Schmidt 
(1999) or Cox et al. (2007) use different social preferences to explain these differences. 
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In the model of this paper I include inequality aversion as another explanatory factor for 
the lower agreement rates achieved by proposed arbitration mechanisms. If the utility 
function takes into account the inequality aversion and the disputants have optimistically 
biased beliefs about the size of the pie, the final offers of the two risk-neutral disputants 
do not lead to an agreement anymore. However, this result holds only under the non-
standard assumption that the inequality aversion coefficient has different values if the 
outcome is the result of the negotiation rather than is the result of arbitration. Although 
the Cox et al. (2007) model allows some flexibility for the emotional state function and 
avoids such an assumption, this model does not offer tractable solutions for this 
application. 
4.2 Literature review 
The No Arbitration treatment is similar to a strike. There are two disputants who 
have a period of negotiation to agree upon the value of a variable X. The value of 
variable X determines how the economic pie is split between the two disputants. For one 
disputant higher values of X imply better payoffs, while for the other disputant lower 
values of X imply better payoffs. If the two disputants do not reach an agreement once 
the negotiation period is over, their payoff is equal to $0. Because of strategic effects in a 
game that is played more than once between the same disputants, the optimal strategy 
might be not to accept any offer made by the counterpart, which leads to no agreements 
in early periods of the game. However, in a one-shot game if any strictly positive payoff 
is offered, the two disputants should reach an agreement, as any agreement will  result in 
a better payoff than $0. The results from experiments show that in such situations there 
are more than 20% of disputes in which the two disputants do not reach an agreement. 
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Such disagreements cannot be explained by the risk preferences of the subjects or by their 
beliefs about the choice of the arbitrator like in the other treatments. One factor that 
might explain these disagreements is inequality aversion. 
Güth et al. (1982) conduct the first experiment of a simplified version of an 
ultimatum game. The game has two players (proposer and responder) and two stages. In 
the first stage player 1 (the proposer) receives an amount of money and has to decide how 
much she will keep and how much she will give to player 2 (the responder). In the second 
stage player 2 can keep the amount received or reject it. If she rejects the offer, both 
players receive a payoff of $0. The subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is the player 1 
offers nothing (or almost nothing) and player 2 accepts any positive offer. Contrary to the 
theoretical prediction, in most of the economic experiments involving the ultimatum 
game, player 1 offers on average 30%-40% of the pie with the mode at 50% and player 2 
often rejects offers below 20% (Camerer et al. (1995)).  
Forsythe et al. (1994) run an experiment to explain if the difference between 
experimental results and theoretical predictions can be explained by strategic behavior or 
by fairness. In one treatment the subjects play a dictator game instead of the ultimatum 
game. The dictator game is a modified version of the ultimatum game, in which player 
1’s split of the pie is the final outcome of the game and player 2 does not have any choice. 
The distributions of offers in the two treatments (dictator game and ultimatum game) are 
different, which implies that fairness cannot explain the entire difference between the 
experimental outcomes and the theoretical predictions in ultimatum games. In the dictator 
game the amount offered by player 1 moves towards the theoretical prediction. On the 
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other hand player 1 still offers nontrivial amount of money, which implies that there are 
social preferences that lead player 1 to offer a positive amount to player 2. 
Güth et al. (1998) conduct a similar experiment in which they try to distinguish 
between strategic behavior and fairness by changing the information that player 2 
receives. Their experiment is similar to the ultimatum game but includes 3 players: the 
proposer, the decider and a passive player. In the first stage player 1 decides how to split 
the pie between the three of them. A message is sent to the decider about the split of the 
pie and player 2 decides to accept or reject the offer. The difference between treatments is 
the information that the message contains. In one treatment (full information) the 
message has the shares of the pie for each player. In the second treatment (essential 
information) the message contains only the share for player 2 and in the last treatment 
(irrelevant information) the message contains only the share for player 3 (the passive 
player). The results of the experiment show that the proposer offers only marginal 
amounts to the passive players and small shares to the decider in the irrelevant 
information treatment. One of the authors’ conclusions is similar to the one from the 
dictator game: high offers in the ultimatum game are not entirely because of fairness, but 
rather because the proposer tries to appear fair. However, the proposers are not 
completely selfish. 
To explain why in certain situations, such as the ultimatum game, a public goods 
game with punishments, or gift exchange games standard self-interest models cannot 
explain the empirical results, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) consider inequality aversion. 
Their utility function includes two types of inequality aversion. For a two-player case, a 
person has a decrease in her utility function if her payoff is smaller than the other person 
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and also has a smaller decrease in her utility function when her payoff is bigger than the 
payoff of the other person: 
  (     )          {       }       {       }                                     ( ) 
The authors assume       and       . 
The assumption       implies that a person has a stronger dislike for a 
disadvantageous split of the pie than an advantageous split of the pie. The assumption 
     implies that there are not subjects that get some positive utility from being better 
off than the counterpart. The assumption      implies that there are not subjects that 
are willing to give up more than $1 in order to reduce the difference by $1.  Situations in 
which there are subjects that break these three assumptions are very implausible. 
One important result of the paper is that in a market with competition, such as in 
an ultimatum game with multiple proposers or multiple responders, the inequality 
aversion effect disappears and the outcome is similar to the standard model of self-
interested agents. Another result is that, given that the proposer has beliefs about her 
opponent’s parameter    and given that these believes are described by a discrete 
distribution - which is consistent with previous experimental results - it is possible to 
calculate the optimal offer of the proposer as a function of her own parameter   . The 
result shows that it is not optimal to offer less than 33% of the pie even if the proposer is 
completely selfish. This is consistent with the results from experiments that show that 
offers below 25% are rare. Furthermore, the value of the parameter    can be elicited 
using the dictator game. List (2007) mentions that “the dictator game represents the 
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workhorse within experimental economics, frequently used to test theory and provide 
insights into the prevalence of social preferences.” 
While this model takes into account the final outcomes of the two players, it does 
not take into account other factors, such as player intentions toward the counterpart 
(hostile or kind, self-interested or not) or the institution of the game, which might change 
the two players’ behavior. 
Blount (1995) investigates the ultimatum game in a setting in which the opponent 
is non-human (the choice of the opponent is a random draw made by a computer) and in 
which the choice of how to split the initial amount is made by a neutral-third party (with 
no self-interest), as opposed to a self-interested player, as in the standard game. In her 
experiment the subjects receive a 3- or 4-page instruction which includes three questions. 
The subjects have to complete each page before they moved to the next one. The first 
page explains the ultimatum game to the students. For each treatment, player 1 is a self-
interested person, a neutral third-party or a computer-simulated player. The first 
treatment of the experiment is a standard ultimatum game. Two subjects are randomly 
matched and randomly assigned as a player 1 (“proposer”) or player 2 (“decider”). Player 
1 decides how to split $10 between them and player 2 decides to accept or reject the offer. 
In the second treatment the two subjects are randomly matched, but the decision of how 
to split the $10 between the two subjects is made by a neutral-third party and not by 
player 1. Player 2 still can accept or reject the offer. In the last treatment the neutral third-
party is replaced by a lottery that has equal probability for each possible allocation of the 
endowment between the two subjects. 
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Page 2 has a question related to the beliefs of the subjects about how the offers 
will be distributed across all possible outcomes if 100 players are in the situation 
described by that specific treatment. On page 3 subjects have to write the minimum offer 
that they would accept if they were randomly assigned as player 2 (“decider”). For the 
first treatment there is also a fourth page on which the subjects have to write what offer 
they would make if they were randomly assigned as player 1 (“proposer”). 
 The third treatment has a lower mean of minimum acceptable outcomes than the 
other two treatments ($1.20 compared to $2.91 in treatment 1 and $2.08 in treatment 2). 
Tests show that there is a statistically significant difference in means. 
List (2007) and Bardsley (2008) show that institution in a dictator game is very 
important. Both papers offer a set of choices for player 1 which includes the action of 
taking money from player 2’s initial endowment. List (2007) extends Bardsley (2008)’s 
design by introducing another origin of the initial endowment (in one treatment the 
subjects perform a task in order to earn their initial endowment) and by varying the 
maximum amount of money that player 1 can take from player 2. Both authors find that 
such manipulations in the set of actions change the behavior of the subjects. However, as 
in previous studies, no matter what the set of actions is, the subjects do not choose the 
most selfish outcome. 
The main assumption of my model is related to the change in institutions between 
the negotiation stage and arbitration. During negotiation, if an agent accepts an offer she 
takes into account the split of the pie offered by her counterpart (who is seen as a self-
interested person). If she goes for arbitration, she takes into account the split of the pie 
that is determined by the arbitrator (a random draw in arbitration experiments). Because 
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of this change in the institution of the game, I assume that each agent has different 
inequality aversion coefficients (  ) during the two stages.  
One difference between a standard ultimatum game and arbitration is related to 
the information about the size of the pie. In most ultimatum games both players know 
exactly the size of the pie that they should split. In contrast, in arbitration, the subjects 
generally only have information regarding their own payoff. When a firefighter 
negotiates his contract, he does not know what the size of the pie is. He only has beliefs 
regarding what a fair wage for him is. The same situation occurs with an injured person 
that asks for compensation. In laboratory experiments each player has information about 
her payoff function, but not the counterpart’s payoff function. Kagel et al. (1996) 
examine an ultimatum game with incomplete information. In this experiment two 
subjects participate in an ultimatum game and have to split a number of chips. These 
chips have different conversion rates for player 1 and player 2. Because of these 
conversion rates the experimenter is able to offer information about the payoff functions 
to one of the players or to both players. Depending on which player receives information 
about the conversion rates, the amount offer by player 1 and the rejection rates vary. 
The case of No Arbitration treatments in which the two subjects do not reach an 
agreement during negotiation and need to submit final offers is similar to the social 
dilemma called the resource dilemma. The resource dilemma has the following setting: 
there are   players and a common resource of size  . Each player makes her request    
from this resource. After all members make their request, if                , 
each of the subject receives her request. Otherwise, each of them receives nothing. As in 
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the situation described in the previous paragraph, incomplete information about the size 
of the pie leads to lower provision rates (which is similar to higher disagreement rates). 
Budescu et al. (1992) conduct an experiment involving a resource dilemma with 
simultaneous or sequential requests with incomplete information about the size of the 
resource. The Nash equilibrium solution for the simultaneous game with uncertainty 
about the size of the resource is derived by Rapoport and Suleiman (1992). The 
simultaneous request setting for two players is exactly like the final offers stage of the No 
Arbitration treatment in an arbitration experiment. In their experiment there are groups of 
five subjects. The size of the resource is drawn from a uniform distribution defined on the 
closed interval [   ] . There are three distributions:        ,              
and           . One result of this paper is that increasing the uncertainty of the 
size of the resource leads to lower provision rates. This result, together with the result of 
Kagel et al. (1996), suggests that disagreement in disputes solved by an arbitration 
mechanism should also depend on information that the subjects have about the size of the 
pie. 
4.3 The model 
Theoretical papers about arbitration mechanisms assume that the disputants are 
risk-neutral and they prove if the two disputants’ final offers converge to reach an 
agreement or not. The literature has found that for DOA, CombA and α-FOA, two risk-
neutral disputants will reach an agreement by themselves. In the following model I 
include also the inequality aversion. I calculate the certainty equivalent for α-FOA and 
CA (the most promising arbitration mechanisms),  and show that, contrary to previous 
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theoretical predictions, the two disputants do not always reach an agreement by 
themselves.  
Consider a setting in which there is a “seller” and a “buyer” who negotiate over 
the value of a variable  . For the seller, higher values of   increase her utility function, 
while for the buyer lower values of   increase her utility function. If the buyer and seller 
do not reach an agreement after a period of negotiation, one of the arbitration methods 
(either α-FOA or CA) is applied. Under arbitration, the fair settlement of the arbitrator is 
a random draw from a distribution function with cumulative distribution  ( ) (    ) 
continuous. Both disputants are risk-neutral and exhibit inequality aversion, so that their 
utility function is described by Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) utility function: 
  (     )          {       }       {       }                             ( ) 
where       and       . 
Given this utility function I calculate the certainty equivalent for the seller and 
buyer under α-FOA and CA. I then compare the two final offers,   
   ,to see if these 
values indicate that the two disputants have reached an agreement or not. 
For α-FOA Zeng (2006) proves that two        offers form an equilibrium if and 
only if         and: 
  (  )  ∫   ((   )        )   ( )  
 
  
                                       ( ) 






The value of    that makes equation 2 hold with equality is the seller’s certainty 
equivalent   
   (the value that makes her indifferent between arbitration and accepting 
that offer). Similarly, there is a certainty equivalent for the buyer   
   . When the two 
values of the certainty equivalent are compared, if   
     
   then there is no value   that 
satisfies (3) and (4), and thus there is no equilibrium strategy (i.e. the two disputants do 
not reach an agreement). 
Assumption 1: The two disputants have different coefficients of inequality 
aversion    when they consider an outcome as a result of an offer from the counterpart 
(  
 ) compared to an outcome as a result of a choice of the arbitrator (  
 ), and   
    
 . 
The inequality   
    
 implies that an agent is willing to accept a lower offer 
from arbitration (a random draw) than from her counterpart.  
Assumption 1 is crucial to these results. This assumption is non-standard in the 
literature on inequality aversion. A different approach, which would avoid such an 
assumption, would be to use the Cox et al. (2007) model of reciprocity and fairness. 
Unfortunately, the Cox et al. (2007) model does not offer tractable solutions for this 
application. I include a more detailed discussion of this approach at the end of this section. 
However, Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model with this assumption is similar to the Cox et 
al. (2007) model in which     (where α is the coefficient from the Cox et al. (2007) 
model that describes the curvature of the indifference curve) and in which the emotional 
state function  (   ) takes two values:   
  if the outcome if determined by the arbitrator 
and   
  if the outcome is determined by negotiations. This can be viewed as an attempt to 
capture social preferences related to the manner in which the final outcome is obtained.  
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Thus, despite the fact that the assumption of varying α’s is not common in the literature, 
it is closely related to previous work employing an emotional state function, as described 
above. 
Given that the size of the pie that the two disputants try to split is  , and that 
       , the utility function for the “seller” is: 
  (  )  {
      (     )           
      (     )          
                                      ( ) 
Case 1:       
As described in Chapter 2, α-FOA is similar to a second-price auction. If the two 
disputants do not reach an agreement during the negotiation stage, they must submit their 
final offers. If these final offers still do not imply an agreement, then the arbitrator makes 
her choice of a fair settlement. The disputant that has the final offer closest to this fair 
settlement wins the arbitration. The final outcome of the arbitration depends on the value 
of the fair settlement of the arbitrator and on the final offer of the loser of the arbitration. 
The equation that gives the value of the final outcome is the following: 
                   |        |                                                     ( ) 
where   is the arbitrator’s fair settlement value and        is the final offer of the loser. 
The sign is positive if the winner is the seller and negative if the winner is the buyer. The 
CA’s final outcome is equal to the value of the fair settlement, so that CA is a degenerate 
case of α-FOA, where      Thus, for this model I consider the more general case of α-
FOA.  
The certainty equivalent for α-FOA is given by the following equality: 
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where  ( ) is the distribution function that describes the beliefs about the arbitrator’s 
choice of the fair settlement. 
Observation: Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Zeng (2003) each use α as a parameter, 
but with different meanings.  In order to avoid confusion, I change Zeng’s (2003) 
notation from α to  . 
  (  )       
  (     )  (     
 )       
                               ( ) 
∫   ((   )        )   ( )   
 
  
 ∫[(     
 )((   )      )    
   ]   ( )  
 
  
 (     
 )  (   )    (     
 )         
                             ( ) 
where   is the expected value of  ( ). 
To calculate the certainty equivalent, I set equation (8) equal to equation (9): 
(     
 )       
    (     
 )  (   )    (     
 )         
    
Solving for    , the certainty equivalent is: 
  
   
(     
 )  (   )
(     
    (     
 ))
   
  
    
 
(     
    (     
 ))
                    (  ) 
In the CA case (   ) the certainty equivalent is equal to: 
  
   
(     
 )
(     
 )
   
  
    
 
(     
 )
                                                    (  ) 
91 
 
If subjects do not exhibit inequality aversion (  
    
   )  the solution is 
  
     for both types of arbitration. Using the same logic for the buyer results in 
  
      This implies that   
     
      So there is a value     that satisfies the 
conditions from Zeng (2006) for an equilibrium offer. The same result holds when the 
Assumption 1 is broken (  
    
 ). This result is due to the fact that if the subjects 
exhibit inequality aversion and   
    
    , the utility function  takes a different 
functional form than   (  )     , but is still a utility function for a risk-neutral person. 
As Zeng (2006) shows,     is a Nash equilibrium strategy for any general utility 
function that describes a risk-neutral person. 
Given Assumption 1,   
   can still be equal to  . Assuming that   
    
    
  
     if equation (10) is equal to  : 
(     
 )  (   )
(     
    (     
 ))
   
  
    
 
(     
    (     
 ))
                            (  ) 
Solving for   results in      . This implies that the two disputants still reach 
an agreement by themselves if the arbitrator’s expected choice of fair settlement is not 
biased towards one of the disputants:   
 
 
  This is possible due to the fact that even if 
the utility function is   (  )        (     ), if   
 
 
 , the second term of the 
function that involves inequality aversion is equal to 0. 
However if the seller has optimistically biased beliefs about the size of the pie 
          , even if the arbitrator’s choice is not biased, replacing   with       results 
in: 
  
       
  
    
 
(     
    (     
 ))
                                                     (  )  
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By symmetry, it implies that the buyer also wants a share of the pie bigger than  . 
Because   
     
    , there is no   to satisfy equations (3) and (4).  In this case the two 
disputants do not reach an agreement by themselves.  
It worth mentioning that this is a different type of biased beliefs than the one 
described by Dickinson (2003). Dickinson (2003) assumes that the disputants have biased 
beliefs about the choice of a fair settlement of the arbitrator.  In other words, there are 
two different distribution functions   ( )  and   ( )  that describe this fair settlement.  
Even if the two disputants choose to play the Nash equilibrium strategy - which is the 
expected value of the distribution function that describes their own beliefs - it might be 
the case        In such a case, the two disputants will not reach an agreement. This is 
the case when the disputants have optimistic beliefs about the choice of the fair 
settlement. In this model the two disputants have the same beliefs about the distribution 
functions   ( )    ( )   ( )  that describe this fair settlement. But because the 
disputants are now inequality-averse, they also have beliefs about the size of the pie. If 
the disputants have optimistically biased beliefs about the size of the pie, then it results in 
no contract zone, and thus in no agreement. 
However, it is not necessary for both players to have biased beliefs about the size 
of the pie in order not to reach the agreement. For example, without loss of generality if 
only the buyer knows the size of the pie (       ) , it results in   
    . But   
     , 
so the two disputants still do not reach an agreement. 
Proposition 1: If the 2 disputants have different coefficients of inequality aversion 
   with   
    
 , and if at least one of the disputant has optimistically biased beliefs 
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about the size of the pie, the two risk-neutral disputants do not reach an agreement under 
α-FOA. 
As I mention in Section 1 of this chapter, in real cases and in most arbitration 
laboratory experiments, the disputants do not know the size of the pie that they have to 
split. In the experiment presented in Chapter 3 the sellers and the buyers have 
information about their own payoff functions but do not have any information about the 
payoff function of the counterpart. This result is similar to what Kagel et al. (1996) find 
for an ultimatum game and Budescu et al. (1992) find for a resource dilemma when 
subjects do not have perfect information about the size of the pie.  
This result can explain why in the No Arbitration treatment subjects prefer a 
payoff of $0 to an offer that they might think represents an unfair split of the pie. It can 
also can explain why risk-neutral subjects do not reach an agreement under α-FOA and 
choose instead to go to arbitration. 
In the case when the arbitrator’s choice of fair settlement is biased in the sense 
that the seller gets an expected share of the pie less than 
 
 
 (  
 
 
           ), 
using the same logic as above implies   
       
  
    
 
(     
    (     
 ))
  . But in this 
case the buyer gets an expected value from arbitration equal to     
 
 
. This implies 
that, for the buyer,      and   (  )        (     ). Calculating her certainty 
equivalent in this situation results in: 
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(     
  (     
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  (     
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(     
  (     
 )   )
                                                          (  ) 
In this situation it is ambiguous if   
     
    and if there is any value   that 
satisfies equations (3) and (4) because there is no argument that suggests if 
  
    
 
(     
  (     
 )  )
 has a positive or negative sign. Even if it has a positive sign (implying 
that the buyer will have a certainty equivalent similar to the one in figure 3.2), whether or 
not there is a contract zone depends on relative size of 
  
    
 
(     
 )
 compared to 
  
    
 
(     
  (     
 )  )
 . It can be shown, however, that when   
    
 ,   
     so there is no 
contract zone and the two disputants will not reach an agreement. 
Proposition 2: In the case when the arbitrator’s choice of fair settlement is biased 
and the two disputants have different coefficients of inequality aversion   , with   
  
  
 , it is ambiguous if there is a contract zone or not under α-FOA. If   
    
  , then 
there is no contract zone, so that the two disputants do not reach an agreement. 
For the case of CA the results hold, because, as mentioned above, CA is the case 
of case of α-FOA where    . 
Case 2:      . This case is the situation presented in the previous paragraphs 
but reversing the role of the seller and buyer. 
As noted above, Assumption 1 is not common in the literature.  As such, I would 
like to relax this assumption if possible. However, as I will now describe, relaxing this 
assumption by using the Cox et al. (2007) model of reciprocity and fairness leads to an 
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intractable solution for the certainty equivalent. This solution does not provide a 
functional form that allows one to make any predictions regarding the value of the 
certainty equivalent relative to the expected value of the distribution function that 
describes arbitrator’s choice of fair settlement. It is therefore impossible to determine 
whether or not a contract zone exists. Thus, I believe Assumption 1 is necessary to make 
progress on the questions of interest. 
Cox et al. (2007) consider a two-player game with perfect information. The first 
mover,   receives a payoff   and the second mover   receives a payoff  . The utility 
function of   has the following functional form: 
 (   )  {
(      )
 
   (    )  (   ]
       
                                      (  ) 
where   is the emotional state of the player and is a function of status   and reciprocity  . 
Reciprocity is  ( )   ( )     where ( ) is the maximum payoff the second mover 
can guarantee himself when the first mover chooses   and     (  ), where    is 
neutral in some appropriate sense. In addition to the curvature of the utility function, one 
difference between this and the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s model comes from the fact  
that Cox et al. (2007) assume that a player gains utility from  his own income, and  either 
gains utility or is  neutral regarding the other player’s income. 
In arbitration both players make offers or accept offers, so there is no first or 
second mover. This assumption is important in order to determine the functional form for 
status   and reciprocity  . One might make the assumption that in the last moment of 
negotiation both players are second movers because they have the time to accept the offer 
of the counterpart, but not to make additional counteroffers. Given this assumption the 
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next step is to calculate the certainty equivalent for each player. This implies solving the 
following integral: 
∫
{[(   )    ]   (   )  [  (   )    ] }
 




Because of the coefficient  , which describes the curvature of the utility function, 
the integral does not offer a tractable solution. To obtain a convenient form for utility 
function, consider    , which implies linear utility curves, similar to Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999). In this case the utility function proposed by Cox et al. (2007) becomes similar to 
the utility function Fehr and Schmidt (1999) when      : 
 (   )     (   )                                                                   (  ) 
 (     )  (    )                                                              (  ) 
Further it is important to describe the functional form of the emotional state 
function  (   ). Because both players are second movers, there is no difference in status 
between players, which implies    . The reciprocity variable is  ( )   ( )    . 
While   is a parameter of the model, ( ) represents the maximum that a player can 
obtain when the counterpart offered him  . In this application, under the assumption that 
there is no time for a counteroffer, a player that has received an offer of   can obtain no 
more than  , so  ( )      . This functional form is the same assumed by Cox et al. 
(2007) for the ultimatum game. This implies that the emotional state function is equal to 
 (   )   (    ). Under these assumptions integral (16) can be solved. However, the 
solution for the certainty equivalent does not offer a closed-form solution that is 
comparable with the expected value. Thus it is impossible to determine whether or not 
there is a contract zone.  
97 
 
Using various parameters values, such as those from Chapter 3 and values 
estimated by Cox et al. (2007)), I am able solve the model numerically. However, the 
numerical results do not offer a reasonable economic interpretation. I thus conclude that 
while the model of Cox et al. (2007) does not need Assumption 1, this model does not 
offer a tractable solution for my application. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Under the arbitration mechanisms of DOA, CombA and α-FOA two risk-neutral 
disputants should reach an agreement according to existing theory.  However, laboratory 
experiments show that all three mechanisms offer low agreements rates and that only α-
FOA is able to obtain higher agreements rate than CA. These low agreements rates 
cannot be fully explained by the risk preferences of the disputants or by their optimism 
about the arbitrator’s choice of the fair settlement. This idea is supported by the fact that 
in the No Arbitration treatment described in Chapter 3 and similar studies the disputants 
do not reach an agreement and prefer a payoff of $0 even if any amount offered by the 
counterpart is better than $0. 
In this paper I propose separate factor that can change subjects’ behavior and 
prevent them from reaching an agreement: inequality aversion. The model described in 
this paper includes inequality aversion and assumes that disputants have different 
coefficients of inequality aversion when they consider an outcome as the result of an 
offer from the counterpart rather than the result of a choice of the arbitrator. The model 
predicts that under α-FOA or CA two risk-neutral disputants will not reach an agreement 
if at least one of them has optimistically-biased beliefs about the size of the pie that they 
will share. This is contrary to the previous predictions of theoretical models that do not 
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include inequality aversion, and offers a possible explanation for the low agreement rates 
observed in experimental settings. 
As in most of the papers about arbitration mechanisms, this one assumes that the 
disputants are risk-neutral, while in fact some of the subjects are risk-averse.  While 
assuming that the subjects are risk-averse might not change the existence of a contract 
zone, the size of the contract zone may differ when the model includes risk aversion and 
inequality aversion. Future research should try to compare the size of the contract zone 
under α-FOA or CA when the model takes into account risk aversion and inequality 
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CHAPTER 5.  PRICE STRUCTURE IN A TWO-SIDED MARKET MONOPOLY – 
AND ECONOMICS EXPERIMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
The network effects literature (Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1994)) shows that due to 
externalities, the utility generated by the consumption of a good might depend on the 
number of consumers of that good. When a person buys a telephone, that person will take 
into account the number of people that have telephones. She does not get any utility from 
the telephone if no one else uses them. There are also post-purchase externalities. People 
who would like to purchase a car would like to have access to auto parts and auto repair 
shops. A person has a better chance to find auto parts if more consumers bought the same 
model as she did. One of the main assumptions in this literature is that only one type of 
consumer exists and the network effects affect only this type of consumer. However, in 
the credit card market, for example, there are two different types of agents: merchants 
(the sellers) and buyers (the consumers). If more merchants accept credit cards as a 
method of payment, then more buyers would like to have and use credit cards. On the 
other hand, a larger number of buyers that hold credit cards will influence more 
merchants to accept credit cards as a method of payment.  
Recently Armstrong (2006), Armstrong and Wright (2007), Caillaud and Jullien 
(2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) and Hagiu (2009) presented theoretical models 
for the case of network effects with cross-group externalities. To date there is little
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 empirical work regarding this literature (Chakravorti and Roson (2006)), other than the 
case of the credit card market. In one such paper, Kaiser and Wright (2006) estimated a 
model of competition in the magazines market using a data set that covers 18 magazine 
markets from Germany. My study presents the design and the results of an experiment 
investigating the effects of different policies in a two-sided market monopoly on the price 
structure and on the consumer surplus. 
The optimal price structure in this type of market has specific properties that are 
important for policy makers. In a one-sided market a firm is not allowed by law to charge 
a price below cost, since a firm could adopt predatory pricing to force the competitors to 
exit the market or limit price to cause them to not enter the market. In a two-sided market, 
however, a firm might choose to charge one type of agents a price below cost in order to 
increase the number of this type of agents, which would lead to an increase in profit from 
the other type of agents. Thus, the theoretical models predict that, depending on cost and 
demand, the optimal price may be below cost on one side of the market even for a 
monopolist with no threat of new entry. The total consumer surplus (the surplus of the 
agents from both sides of the market) might also increase compared to the situation in 
which the monopolist is not allow to charge a price below cost. This indicates that policy 
makers should take into account the type of the market with consumption externalities, 
one sided or two-sided, in order to differentiate a predatory pricing strategy in a one-
sided market and an optimal price structure strategy in a two-sided market. This 
experiment will implement a two-sided market monopoly in order to provide empirical 
evidence to investigate actual pricing behavior in a controlled setting. In the parameter 
environment of the base model, the predicted price for type A agents is 50% less then 
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cost per-agent but the platform is able to make a positive total profit in both the short run 
and long run. The results from the experiment are consistent with these predictions in the 
sense that subjects charge a price below cost on one side of the market even if there is no 
threat of new entry. 
The experiment also investigates the results of three different policies on the 
prices that a monopolist charges the two types of agents. If a policy maker does not 
identify the market as a two-sided market, she might prohibit prices below marginal cost. 
This policy would have the effect of increasing the price on the side where the price was 
below cost and decreasing the price on the other side of the market. Because of the 
increase in price on their side of the market, fewer agents on that side will join the 
platform. This will lead to fewer agents on the other side of the market even though the 
price on their side of the market decreases. In the end this policy might lead to a decrease 
in consumer surplus. Another constraint that the policy maker might impose is that the 
monopolist must charge the same price on both sides of the market. For example dating 
websites, like eHarmony.com or Match.com, have to charge the same price for both 
women and men. Especially in a market with strong cross-group externalities, this 
constraint leads to a strong distortion of the optimal price structure, which will lead to a 
decrease in total consumer surplus. The last policy that this study investigates is the effect 
of a tax or subsidy on price structure. In a one-sided monopolistic market an increase in 
cost due to a tax leads to an increase in price. If the policy maker applies a tax that leads 
to an increase in cost on the side of the agents that most value the other type of agents, 
the effect is the same as in a one-sided market: the prices on both sides of the market 
increase. But a tax that leads to an increase in cost on the side of the agents that value the 
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other type of agents less leads to an increase in price on that side of the market, but a 
decrease in price on the other side of the market. The results of the experiment confirm 
these predictions. 
5.2 Terminology 
The platform. In this literature, the firm that helps the two types of agents to 
interact is called the “platform”. It is common to say that the agents “join the platform” in 
order to explain the fact that the agents decided to buy the good or service from a 
particular firm that will help the agents to interact. Some examples of platforms in two 
sided markets are: credit card associations like VISA and MasterCard, websites like 
Amazon.com and eHarmony.com, and video consoles like Wii and PlayStation. 
Single-homing and multi-homing. The agents can join one platform or multiple 
platforms. Armstrong (2006) uses the term “single-home” to describe the situation in 
which an agent chooses to use just one platform, and when the agent chooses several 
platforms, the agent is said to “multi-home”. In the newspaper market, most readers will 
choose to read only one newspaper. So the readers single-home. But in the same market, 
the advertisers will like to reach all readers, so they will publish their ads in multiple 
newspapers. The advertisers multi-home. 
 Competitive bottlenecks. Depending upon whether a side of the market is single-
homing or multi-homing, there are three possible situations: when both sides are single-
homing, when one side is single-homing and the other is multi-homing and when both 
sides are multi-homing. Armstrong (2006) says that we might not expect the last case. 
His argument is that if one side of the market speaks both English and French, there is no 
reason for the other side to learn both English and French, because knowing just one of 
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these languages is enough to interact and communicate with the other side. Indeed there 
are not many cases in which both sides multi-home. Armstrong (2006) refers to the case 
in which on side single-homes and the other multi-homes as a “competitive bottleneck”. 
In this case, the multi-homing agents have no choice but to deal with the platform that 
was chosen by each single-homing agent from the other side. 
5.3 Literature Review 
Evans (2003a) has a review of this type of market and presents some specific 
businesses that are described as two-sided markets. Evans has a more detailed 
presentation in “The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets.” Another 
paper that is interesting as an introduction to this field is Wright (2004). This paper 
presents some differences between one-sided and two-sided markets through eight 
fallacies that a policy maker might face if he applies one-sided logic in two-sided markets. 
These fallacies are illustrated through several real life examples, from reports of different 
institutions, including the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Australia 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The reports concern pricing rules in 
the credit card market and show how a wrong approach (the logic from one-sided markets) 
can make things worse or have no effect. The second fallacy of the paper states: “A high 
price-cost margin indicates market power” (p.47). Even in a very competitive market, if 
there are cross-group externalities, we can observe a high price-cost margin on one side 
of the market. As in Wright (2004), he uses nightclubs as an example of this phenomenon. 
Nightclubs will compete to attract more women that will then bring more men to join the 
platform by setting a lower price for women. But at the same time the platforms set a 
higher price for men due to the benefits that women bring to the men, not because of 
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market power. A more balanced price structure will not necessarily attract more users to 
join the platform and the platform’s profit may be lower. But ACCC and RBA state in 
their report that: ”Competitive pressures in card payment networks in Australia have not 
been sufficiently strong to bring interchange fees into line with costs” (p.56). This 
example is also related to the third fallacy of the paper, which states: “A price below 
marginal cost indicates predation.” Using Wright’s example, we can observe that even in 
a monopoly case, a nightclub might charge women a price below cost to increase the 
number of the women that attend the club. The increase in number of women will attract 
more men and will increase the overall profit. So a platform may charge a price below 
cost not because it wants to compete very aggressively against competitors, but because 
that it is the optimal price structure. 
Genakos and Valletti (2012) also have a short review of the recent literature 
related to the “waterbed effect” of the price structure in mobile telephony as a two-sided 
market. This study has two important conclusions regarding regulating prices in two-
sided markets. The first one underlines the fact that two-sided markets are special 
markets and policy makers should be more careful when they try to regulate such markets. 
On the other hand, prices in a competitive two-sided market might differ from the 
socially-optimal prices and require a more regulatory oversight rather than less, like in a 
one-sided market. 
Hagiu (2007) has a similar approach, but he presents a theoretical model that 
studies the choice of an intermediation agent to be a “merchant” or a two-sided platform. 
In “merchant mode”, the third-party buys the goods from the sellers and then sells them 
to the consumers. In “two-sided mode”, the third-party just helps the sellers and the 
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buyers to interact, without buying the goods. A good example of a firm that is a two-
sided platform is Amazon.com. Although Amazon.com started to maintain its own stocks 
of goods, its main business is to bring together two types of agents, sellers and buyers. 
Amazon.com does not buy the goods, but it helps these types of agents interact and 
charges them different fees. The choice between being a “merchant” or a two-sided 
platform depends on different factors. The main ones are:  
 indirect network effects between buyers and sellers; when the probability 
of unfavorable seller expectations if other sellers join the same platform is 
high enough, the merchant is able to internalize the network effects and 
the “merchant” mode is preferred to the two-sided platform. 
 asymmetric information between sellers and the third-party; when the 
sellers are more efficient at distributing their own products (for example, it 
is impossible for eBay to have accurate knowledge about all goods’ 
markets and all the goods that are sold on this website), then the platform 
is preferred to the merchant mode. 
 investment incentives; the producers of the videogame console chose to be 
a platform and they charge the game developers royalties. They don’t buy 
the game software from the game developers because they want to give 
some incentive to the game developers to improve the game. If the cost of 
the improvement is relatively low for the platform, then the platform 
might buy the game software and will choose to be a merchant. 
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 product complementarity/substitutability; the merchant is able to 
internalize the complementarity (substitutability) between sellers’ products, 
so the merchant mode is preferred to the platform one. 
The analysis and the results of Hagiu (2007) hold for monopoly. As the author 
mentions, a competition model should raise more strategic issues, but his paper does not 
analyze this situation. 
Caillaud and Jullien (2001) present a basic model of intermediation. Their study 
focuses especially on intermediation via the internet, but the paper is a first step in 
approaching two-sided markets more broadly. As they mention, a more complete analysis 
of the equilibrium is provided by Caillaud and Jullien(2003). The latter study presents a 
competition model of intermediation providers (platforms). The authors consider two 
homogeneous populations, each consisting of a continuum of mass one of identical 
agents. The agents get utility by finding a match with an agent of a different type. 
Without the platform, the agents are not able to find a match (therefore their utility is 
zero). If both types of agents join a platform, the platform has a probability     to find 
a match for any agent. Each of the two platforms charge a registration fee   
  and a total 
transaction fee   . If the user can register with at most one platform an efficient 
allocation of the users is one in which all users will register with the same platform. If all 
users choose one platform (and the other one is inactive) then the equilibrium is called 
“dominant-firm equilibrium”. In order to keep the other platform inactive, the dominant 
platform should choose such prices that no divide-and-conquer strategy will provide 
positive profit for the second platform. With exogenous single-homing there are only 
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dominant-firm equilibria, where one platform captures all agents on both sides, charges a 
maximal transaction fee, subsidizes registration and makes zero profit. If we allow for 
multi-homing and pure equilibria (their definition of “pure equilibrium” is an equilibrium 
in which agents of the same type all make the same choice), there is a global multi-
homing equilibrium if and only if  (   )     or a dominant-firm equilibrium if and 
only if  (   )   , where   is the marginal cost. For a mixed equilibrium (where users 
of the same type can make different choices) there is no equilibrium with both platforms 
active and no multi-homing if      . If there is no transaction fee (as in the case when 
it is difficult to monitor transactions), a dominant-firm equilibrium exists if and only if 
    (   )    , where    is the share of the total net surplus of the agent of type i, so 
        and    
 
 
    (Caillaud and Jullien assume that type-2 agents have a 
better bargaining position). Another important result for the case of competitive 
bottlenecks is that the single-homing side is subsidized while the multi-homing side has 
no surplus.  
Rochet and Tirole (2003) show that the choice of the model for a platform (which 
side of the market should be charged more or subsidized, and whether to charge a fixed 
fee and/or a per-transaction fee) is a key factor in the success of the business. They 
propose a model for a monopoly platform and competitive platforms. The main 
difference from Caillaud and Jullien (2003) is that the two types of agents are 
heterogeneous. The surplus that the agents get from a transaction on the platform is    
for one type, named “buyers”, and    for the other type, named “sellers”. This leads to 
different elasticities on the two sides of the market. They take as given the matching 
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process, so the volume of the transactions is equal to   (  )    (  ), where   (  ) is 
a “quasi-demand function”3, for      . One more difference is that in the first part of 
the paper, they assume that the platform only charges a per-transaction fee and no fixed 
fee. They also consider fixed costs for platform and fixed fees for agents. 
For the monopoly case, the optimal prices charged by the platform are given by 
the formula: 






                                                                     ( ) 
where    are the elasticities of the quasi-demands. We can observe that the agents 
that have a higher elasticity will be charged more by the monopoly platform. The formula 
is similar to the Lerner formula. 
For the competition model with a symmetric equilibrium, the optimal prices are: 
        
  
   
 
  
(    )
                                                                  ( ) 
where   
  is own-brand elasticity and   is the single-homing index. Rochet and Tirole 
define    as a proportion of “loyal” consumers, i.e. consumers that will stop trading when 
the platform i is not available anymore, and    [   ]  Because of the symmetric price 
structure, it follows that        . When all buyers single-home, which is equivalent 
to    , the own-brand elasticity and demand elasticity coincide, and we get the same 
formula as in the monopoly case. 
If platforms also charge a fixed fee, the symmetric equilibrium prices are given by: 
                                                 
3
 The phrase “quasi-demand function” is used to reflect the fact that, in a two-sided market, actual demand 
depends on the decision of both types of agents (buyers and sellers). In their specification, this demand is 
simply the product of the quasi-demands of buyers and sellers. 
113 
 
        
  




     
 (    
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                                            ( ) 
where   
  
   
   
  
  
 is network elasticity and   
  is cross-price elasticity (the authors 
assume single-homing, i.e.    ). 
Armstrong (2006) is closely related to Rochet and Tirole (2003). The difference 
between these two articles is how the authors treat the heterogeneity of the agents, the 
structure of fees charged by the platforms and the cost of the platforms. The utility of an 
agent that joins a platform is: 
  
    
      
                                                                                ( ) 
where   
  is the benefit of the agent   when she interacts with a different type agent,     is 
the number of agents of a different type that join the platform, and   
  is her benefit from 
joining platform  .  Regarding the heterogeneity of the agent, Rochet and Tirole (2003) 
assume that   
  depends on   and  , but   
  doesn’t depend on   and  . Armstrong (2006) 
assumes   
  doesn’t depend on   and  , but   
  depends on   and  . Regarding the price 
structure, Rochet and Tirole(2003) assume that the platform charges only a per-
transaction fee and not a fixed fee. Armstrong assumes that the platform charges a fixed 
fee. Because Rochet and Tirole (2003) assume a per-transaction fee, the cost for the 
platform is      , while Armstrong (2006) assumes a fixed fee, so the cost of the 
platform is equal to          . 
For the monopoly case, Armstrong (2006) assumes that there are two types of 
agents, denoted 1 and 2, and that each agent cares about the number of agents from the 
other group (  ). Then each agent’s utility is: 
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                                                                            ( ) 
where    are the prices that the platform charges each agent of the two groups and    
measures the benefit of agent i when she interacts with an agent j.  
Assuming that the platform incurs a per-agent cost    , the platform’s profit is: 
    (     )    (     )                                                            ( ) 
In terms of utility and given the notation: 
     (  )                                                                                 ( ) 
the platform’s profit is: 
 (     )    (  )[    (  )       ]    (  )[    (  )       ]              ( ) 
Using the last equation, the optimal prices are: 
           
  (  )
  
 (  )
                                                    ( ) 
The formula says that the price charged on one side of the market is equal to the 
cost of providing service on that side minus the external benefit of the other side plus a 
factor that is related to the elasticity of the demand. We can observe that if the external 
benefit of the other side is bigger than the elasticity factor, the price is below the cost 
(that side of the market is subsidized). And if the external benefit has a high enough value, 
the price can be negative. Given the formula of elasticity, Armstrong obtains a result 
similar to Rochet and Tirole’s (2003) result and the formula of the prices is similar to the 
Lerner formula: 




  (  |  )
                                            (  ) 
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where    is the price elasticity of demand for one type of agents given a level of 
participation of the other type. 
For the competition model, with two platforms, Armstrong (2006) uses a 
Hotelling model specification. In the first case that he approaches he assumes 
exogenously that agents will single-home. The two platforms, A and B, are situated at the 
end points of a unit interval. The agents are uniformly distributed and the transportation 
costs for the two types of agents are   and   . If the agent joins platform i , groups 1 and 
2 will have the utility {  
    
 }. Given the number of agents that a platform attracts and 
the prices that the platform charges, the utility of each agent is: 
  
      
    
      
      
    
                                                            (  ) 
When each group has to choose between the two platforms, Armstrong assumes 
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Using equations (11) and (12) and solving the simultaneous equation for   
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The platform i’s profit is: 
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From the first order conditions, Armstrong (2006) obtains the following formula 
for the prices: 
         
  
  
 (        )                                               (  ) 
The first term on the right side is the cost, the second one is the market power, the 
third represents the extra agent of type-k that joins the platform when an agent of type-i 
joins the platform and the last term represents the profit from an extra type-k agent. 
Solving the system of these two equations, the equilibrium prices are: 
                                                                   (  ) 
Again, if we write the last formula in terms of own-price elasticity, the results are 
similar to the Lerner formula: 





                                                (  ) 
Comparing this with the monopoly formula, the duopolist places twice the weight 
on the external benefits for a group when it sets the price for the other group. 
For the case when one side is single-homing and the other is multi-homing 
(competitive bottlenecks), the platform will choose a price for the multi-homing side that 
will bring on the platform the number of agents from the multi-homing side that will 
maximize the total surplus of the platform and single-homing agents, while the interest of 
multi-homing agents is ignored. This result is similar to Caillaud and Jullien (2003), who 
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find that single-homing agents (the “buyers”) will be subsidized, while multi-homing 
agents (the “sellers”) will have no surplus. 
Armstrong and Wright (2007) study the case of platform competition, also using 
the Hotelling model. They show that if there is strong product differentiation on both 
sides of the market, and if the transportation costs are higher than the benefits that agents 
obtain from interacting with the other side of the market. Then no agent will multi-home 
at a non-negative price. In other words, they don’t impose exogenously that the agents 
single-home. If product differentiation exists on only one side of the market, then there is 
an equilibrium in which the agents from the other side will multi-home. Unlike 
Armstrong (2006), they impose a non-negative price constraint. This constraint is 
plausible as negative prices are rarely observed in the field. In the most cases when a 
platform would like to charge a negative price on one side, usually the platform charges 
nothing the agents from that side. 
Their model is similar to the Armstrong (2006) competitive model: two type of 
agents (buyers and sellers – B and S) interact over two platforms (1 and 2), but the agents 
can join one platform (single-home) or both of them (multi-home). Denoting   
  as the 
number of agents of type k who join exclusively platform i and    as the number of 
agents that multi-home, the utility of an agent that joins platform 1 and is located at 
  [   ] is: 
  
 ( )    
    
        (  
    )                                                         (  ) 
for                          , where   
  is the utility that an agent gets when she 
joins any platform,   
  is the price that platform i charges an agent of type k,    is the 
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transportation cost and    is the benefit of an agent of type k when she interacts with an 
agent of different type. 
If the same agent joins platform 2, then her utility is: 
  
 ( )    
    
    (   )    (  
    )                                         (  ) 
If she chooses to multi-home, her utility is: 
  
  ( )    
    
    
       (  
    
    )                                     (  ) 
The platform’s profit is equal with the price charged on each side of the market   
  minus 
the cost of providing the service per-interaction on each side   , multiplied by the number 
of agents that join each side: 
   (  
    )(  
    )  (  
    )(  
    )                                   (  ) 
First, Armstrong and Wright assume that there is strong product differentiation on 
both sides. In particular, if               , they prove that no agent multi-homes at 
any non-negative prices set by the two platforms (Lemma 1 in their paper). Given this 
lemma, they can focus exclusively on the case when all agents single-home. If   
  is 
sufficiently high such that all agents choose at least one platform,               and 
      (     )
 , there is a unique equilibrium in which all agents single-home, the 
two platforms offer the same prices and half the agents from each group will join each 
platform. If the cost per-interaction plus the transportation cost is greater than the benefits 
on each side          (the equilibrium price is positive on both sides), the equilibrium 
price has a formula similar to Armstrong (2006): 
                                                              (  ) 
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But when this inequality does not hold on one side, so the price on one side 
should be negative (        ), due to the constraint of non-negative prices the 
equilibrium price on that side is zero. Moreover, the platforms will compete more 
aggressively on the other side since competition is constrained on the side where the price 
is zero. Consequently, the equilibrium price on the side with non-zero price will decrease: 
                                                                                           (  ) 
         [
     
  
]                                                              (  ) 
Their conclusion is that the more platforms want to set a negative price on one 
side, the more they will lower the price on the other side. 
The first result is obtained in the same way as in Armstrong (2006) with the 
observation that due to Lemma 1 we have        , so the formulas for the 
platform’s profit in both papers are the same in this case. For the cases when non-
negative price constraints bind, we have the same profit maximization problem, but with 
the relevant constraints   
   . 
Another important result of this paper concerns exclusive contracts. If platforms 
are able to offer exclusive contracts to one side (the “sellers”), then one platform can set a 
high non-exclusive price and a slightly lower (compared to the rival’s) exclusive price. 
The result is that all sellers will sign a contract with this platform. After the platform 
attracts all sellers, it is able to charge the other side (the “buyers”) a premium price. This 
strategy will undermine the competitive bottlenecks equilibrium. Moreover, it will 
reverse the surplus result from the competitive bottlenecks equilibrium. Now, the buyers 
are the group that will have all surplus extracted. 
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Amelio and Jullien (2012) present a model similar to Armstrong (2006) in which 
it is not possible to set a negative price. They relax this constraint, letting the platform to 
tie the sale of another good. In a monopoly this technique raises participation and also 
increases the consumer surplus. In a duopoly, the change in consumers’ surplus depends 
on what will happen on the profitable side: if the competition becomes softer or more 
intense. The competition softening leads to an increase in both prices at the equilibrium 
which will lead to a decrease in consumer surplus (and the other way around). 
Hagiu (2009) shows that another important factor determining the price structure 
charged by the platform is consumer demand for product variety. Consumer demand for 
product variety gives more market power to the sellers as long as their products are less 
substitutable, so the sellers are able to earn greater profits. The platforms realize this and 
will try to extract more profits from the sellers’ side of the market. For the monopoly case, 
Hagiu (2009) shows that depending on the market power of the sellers ( ), elasticity of 
consumers’ demand (   ), elasticity of sellers’ demand (   ) and the intensity of 
consumers’ preference for variety (  ), the platform can subsidize one side, or make 
positive profits on both sides. Hagiu calculates the optimal price structure as a ratio 
between the share of total profits made on sellers     and the share made on consumers 
   . This ratio4 is equal to: 
   
   
 
  (    )(  (   )(    ))
(    )(     (    ))
                                               (  ) 
  Depending upon whether the nominator or the denominator is negative, Hagiu 
concludes that: 
                                                 
4
 As in Hagiu’s paper, I omit functions’ arguments in order to avoid clutter. 
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- if   
  
    
 , the sellers are subsidized; 
- if   
 
   (    )
 , the buyers are subsidized; 
- if 
  
    
    
 
   (    )
  , the platform makes positive profits on 
both sides of the market ; 
Another two contributions of this paper are: i) Hagiu shows that allowing for the 
consumer preference for variety, the strategy in which one platform tries to undercut the 
price of the consumers of the other platform in order to attract more consumers and 
indirectly more sellers will have a smaller effect in driving away the sellers form the 
other platform; ii) Hagiu also shows that in some settings, the platform is indifferent 
between a membership fee (fixed fee) and a royalties/usage fee (per-transaction fee) – 
these two instruments are perfect substitutes.  But when the platform is interested in the 
sellers’ (producers’) level of investment, the usage fee plays an important role. 
Hagiu (2006) approaches another factor that can change the structure of the 
pricing in a two-sided market: commitment. One main characteristic of this type of 
market is that the indirect network effects between buyers and sellers will generate the 
“chicken-and-egg” problem. In order to avoid this problem, the platforms might commit 
ex ante to charge one side a price ex post in order to attract a larger number of agents 
from the other side. A good example is when the producers of game consoles announce 
the price of the console (the fixed fee paid by the buyers) in order to be able to make the 
game developers join their platform and to charge them a higher price. 
The timing of his model is consistent with the game consoles market, where 
usually the game developers (sellers) decide first to join the platform or not. In this 
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situation, the platform has two options: to announce the price for sellers only, and 
announce the price for buyers after sellers join the platform; or to announce the price for 
buyers (if there is any credible commitment) and the price for sellers at the same time. 
These two different strategies will offer different results. The model is similar to Caillaud 
and Jullien (2003). 
Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004) present a competition model similar to Caillaud 
and Jullien (2003), but with some modifications. In their paper the platforms are 
heterogeneous rather than homogenous; the agents can choose not to join any platform, 
where Caillaud and Jullien (2003) assume that all agents join at least one platform. They 
also assume that the agents only pay a registration fee (fixed fee). As in some of the 
papers presented above, Gabszewicz and Wauthy find the equilibrium prices for the 
monopoly case, the duopoly case with single-homing and the duopoly case with multi-
homing. 
Roson (2005) and Rochet and Tirole (2006) have short presentations of the 
progress in the literature of the two-sided market. Moreover, Rochet and Tirole (2006) try 
to develop a more general model and to incorporate the model of Rochet and Tirole 
(2003) with pure per-transaction fees and the model of Armstrong (2006) with pure fixed 
fees. Another important contribution of Rochet and Tirole (2006) is that they establish a 
definition for a two-sided market. A market is a two-sided market if a platform charges a 
per-interaction fee of    for buyers and    for sellers, so that the aggregate price level is 
       , keeping constant the aggregate price  , the total transaction volume 
changes as    and   change. 
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Gabszewicz et al (2001) study the location of newspapers relative to their political 
opinions. They show that newspapers tend to have the policy of “Pensée Unique”. In 
other words, they choose a location which is a “middle point” and not an extreme.  
Their model uses a Hotelling model in which two newspapers can choose their 
political opinion on a unit interval – they can choose their location, where a is the 
distance from the far left extreme to the location of the first newspaper and b is the 
distance from the far right extreme to the location of the second newspaper. By notation, 
the cost per copy of each newspaper is c, t is the intensity of readers’ political opinions 
and 4k is the density of the population of advertisers of type θ. Given that the two 
newspapers choose their political opinion (a,b), the Nash equilibrium of the game is: 




- (     )  (       ), if     
   
  
 
When   
   
  
      
 
 
, both strategies are equilibrium strategies, but the 
strategy (0,0) Pareto-dominates the strategy (0.5,0.5). 
Kaiser and Wright (2006) estimate the market for magazines in Germany and find 
that this market behaves like a two-sided market. The results are consistent with the 
theory that advertisers value readers more than readers value advertisers. Magazines 
subsidize the readers and make a profit by charging the advertisers. Also, this market fits 
the model where the agents of the both sides of the market pay a fixed fee (to join the 




Their data set has information about cover prices, ad prices, the number of ad 
pages, the number of content pages and the circulation numbers of the magazines in 
Germany for each quarter from 1972 to 2003. They group the magazines in different 
market segments depending on their content in such a way that they have two magazines 
in each market segment. Out of 18 market segments, 9 were ruled out due to different 
difficulties. 
Due to endogeneity problems, they use instruments for circulation numbers, the 
number of content pages, the number of ad pages, cover prices and ad rates. They use 
GMM and SUR estimations, and in some cases get quite different results depending on 
the particular estimation strategy. 
The magazines earn an estimated profit of -2,100,830 Euros per year from readers. 
This result shows that readers are subsidized by the platform. At the same time, 
magazines earn an estimated profit of 6,911,360 Euros per year from advertisers. Based 
on these point estimates, these magazines are able to make a positive profit in total, even 
if they have losses on one side. 
Chakravorti and Roson (2006) study platform competition using a particular case 
of payment networks. One interesting result is related to the fact that market competition 
has two effects: a reduction in the total level of the price and a change in the price 
structure.  
Chakravorti and Roson assume that consumers are charged a fixed fee and sellers 
(merchants) are charged a per-transaction fee. The profit for the platform is then: 
  (    )   (    )                                                       (  ) 
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where    is the fixed fee charged for consumers,    is per-transaction fee 
charged for sellers,    is the number of consumers,    is the number of sellers and g and 
c are the fixed costs that the platform incurs for every consumer and seller that join the 
platform. 
They construct an index related to the total welfare. Given a fixed level of profit 
for the platform and a change in prices for consumers and sellers, the index is equal to: 
  (
   
   
 
   
   
)   (
   
   
 
   
   
)                                          (  ) 
where CW is consumer welfare, and MW is the sellers surplus. A positive value for   
means that if there is an increase in    and a decrease in   , keeping profit constant, it is 
possible to have an increase in the aggregate welfare. Calculating the value   for given 
values for some parameters of the model for duopolistic competition and a monopolistic 
cartel, Chakravorti and Roson conclude that competition will increase the pressure on the 
total level of prices and will decrease the total level of prices, but will also change the 
price structure. These changes can have opposing effects. Due to the decrease in the total 
level of prices, there is an increase in welfare. Due to the change in the price structure, a 
decrease in welfare for one side may occur. In their settings, the increase dominates the 
possible decrease, so overall the consumers and the sellers are better off. This result has 
an important policy implication in the credit card market. 
Chakravarty (2003) conducts an experiment concerning technology adoption 
when there are network externalities. He studies the effects of network size on pricing 
and adoption of two competing technologies. Even if there are no cross-group 
externalities, his setting is similar to a two-sided market experiment. The theoretical 
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model is similar, in some ways to Armstrong (2006). There are two technologies (instead 
of platforms) A and B,    homogenous consumers (but just one type of consumer), and 
the consumers’ utility depends on the size of the network that the consumer adopts: 
    (     )                                                                (  ) 
    (     )                                                               (  ) 
Because there is a two stage game, the size of the network is the sum of the 
number of agents that adopt each technology in each stage:      . The consumers are 
homogenous so they have the same benefit function  ( ). In the experiment, this function 
has the following form:  ( )       . In Armstrong (2006), for the monopoly model, 
the functional form for  ( ) is  ( )    . If we change the settings of Chakravarty 
(2003) and add one more type of agent, the experiment is quite similar to Armstrong’s 
model. The model assumes that each technology has a marginal cost of production that 
can be different in each stage:    
  and    
 . Each session of the experiment has 2 
stages and 10 subjects: 2 sellers (one for each technology), 4 buyers for stage 1 and 4 
buyers for stage 2. The time line is the following: the sellers set the prices for stage 1, the 
stage 1 buyers simultaneously decide which technology they want to buy,  and then the 
sellers set the price for stage 2 and the stage 2 buyers decide which technology they want 
to buy. After that the computer calculates the payoffs for each subject. 
Another experimental study that helps in the design of a two-sided market 
experiment is Brown-Kruse et al. (1993), which examines spatial competition. The 
subjects were paired as sellers (in the two-sided market they can be the platforms). The 
consumers (one type of agent) were simulated and uniformly distributed on the interval 
[     ]. Because the experiment cannot allow a continuum representation of the interval, 
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the consumers’ location was at each unit interval. The subjects could choose their 
location and were told that the consumers had a transportation cost t. The consumers 
were homogenous and each consumer’s demand function was  ( )      , where 
          , where     is fixed FOB price that sellers could charge and d is the 
distance to the seller from whom they bought a good. A similar setting can be used in a 
two-sided experiment, with the modification that the platforms have a fixed location (at 
the end of the interval), but the subjects can choose the price that they want to charge the 
agents. 
5.4 Experimental design 
5.4.1 Model structure 
For this experiment, I use Armstrong’s (2006) monopolistic market model. 
Armstrong assumes that there are two types of agents, denoted 1 and 2, and that each 
agent cares about the number of agents from the other group (  ). Each agent’s utility is: 
                                                                       (  ) 
where,    is the price that the platform charges each type of agent and    measures the 
benefit of agent i when she interacts with agent j. The platform’s profit is: 
    (     )    (     )                                                   (  ) 
In terms of utility, Armstrong (2006) assumes the following relationship between 
the number of agents on one side of the market and the utility the agents get: 
     (  )                                                                              (  ) 
where   (  ) is some increasing function. For simplicity, in my experiment I assume 
  (  )       , where    is a constant. This constant allows for positive number of 
agents in the model. Rewriting the demand functions described by (31) and (33), so they 
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are not a function of the number of agents on the other side of the market, the equations 
that describe the demand functions (as a function of prices) are the following: 
   
        
       
 
 
       
    
  
       
                  (  ) 
 
I impose restriction (       )    so the demand is decreasing in     
Given this notation, for the model with no restrictions the optimal prices as a 
function of the parameters of the model are: 
  
  
                   
             
  
            
   
    
  
         
  
            
   
  
    
     
  
            
   
                                           (  ) 
Plugging the optimal prices in to the demand functions, the number of agents that 
will join the platform at the equilibrium is equal to: 
    
                
  
            
   
    
 
  
            
   
  
    
     
  
            
   
                                           (  ) 
 
Assume that at the optimal price   
     and the monopolist is not allowed to 
charge a price below cost. Then the optimal prices are: 
  
                                                                                  (  ) 
  
  






     
 
                                                        (  ) 
and the number of agents that will join the platform is equal to: 
129 
 
    
                   
  (       )
    
       
  (       )
    
  
  (       )
(  ) 
    
        
  (       )
    
  
  (       )
    
 
  (       )
              (  ) 
For the situation when the monopolist is not allowed to charge different prices for 
the two types of agents the optimal prices are: 
  
    
  
                                   
  (       )
              (  ) 
and the number of agents that will join the platform is equal to: 
   
                              
                        
  (       )  (       )
  
    
         
 
 (       )  (       )
    
             
 (       )  (       )
              
5.4.2 Experimental Procedures 
The experiment has 4 treatments: a treatment with no restrictions regarding the 
prices that a subject can charge (called Base); a treatment in which the prices are not 
allowed to be below cost (Above cost); a treatment in which the monopolist is not 
allowed to charge the two types of agents different prices (Same price); and a treatment 
in which there is a higher cost on the side where the agents’ valuation for the other type 
of agents is the lowest (High Cost). There are 3 treatments in each session and the order 
of the treatments is different from one session to another. Each treatment has 20 periods. 
The first 10 periods are practice periods in order to give subjects the freedom to explore 
with no cost their payoff function and only the last 10 periods of each treatment are 
considered for payment. Moreover, in order to ensure that the subjects treat each period 
with the same amount of importance, only two of the last 10 periods of the each treatment 
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are randomly drawn for the final payment. The sum of profits for these periods is the 
subjects’ total experimental earnings. Before each treatment starts, the program shows 
subjects a screen with the restriction or changes compared to the previous treatment. For 
example, before the Same price treatment the screen says: “For the next 20 periods you 
must charge type A customers and type B customers the same price.” 
For each period, each subject owns a firm and this firm is the only firm in the 
market no additional entry allowed. The firm helps two types of agents (in this 
experiment called type A and type B customers) to interact. The customers are computer 
simulated and they decide if they want to join the business in order to be able to interact 
with the agents of the other type. The consumers’ decision to join the business or not 
depends on the prices that the firm charges and the number of agents of the other type 
that join the business. Each subject must choose what prices to charge the two types of 
agents each period. Given these prices and the parameters of the model, equation (34) 
gives the number of agents of each type that join the business. Plugging these results in to 
equation (32), the calculator displays the profit for that period on the screen. At the end of 
each period, the subjects see a screen with the prices that they charged, the number of 
each type of agents that joined their business and the profit that they made. The costs, the 
prices and the profit during the experiment are in francs. The profit is converted to US 
dollars and is paid to each subject at the end of the experiment at a rate of 350 francs to 1 
USD. To help subjects to keep track of this information, a history table with the results 
from each period is displayed on their decision screen. In figure 4.2 there is a screen shot 
with a subjects’ decision screen after 3 periods. 
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For this experiment, the parameters of the model are equal to the values from 
table 4.1. 
The values for the cost per agent    and the constant    are the same for both sides 
of the market, in order to guarantee that the results of the experiment are due to cross-
group externalities and the policies imposed in the market. The equilibrium prices and the 
equilibrium number of agents for each treatment are presented in the following table: 
The experiment was conducted at Purdue University during the spring semester of 
2013 using 24 Purdue undergraduate students during 3 sessions of 8 students each. 
Session lasted on average 1 hour and 15 minutes and the average payment was 
approximately $25 per subject in each session. The program used to run the experiment 
was Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The order of each treatment in each session is presented 
in the table 4.3. 
Hypothesis 1. Even with no threat of new competitors, the price-cost margin for a 
monopoly platform is negative on one side of the market. 
This monopoly model highlights that if a platform sets a price below cost on one 
side of the market, this does not mean that the platform wants to drive the competitor out 
of the market or that the platform wants to create barriers to entry. The platform does not 
have a predatory pricing strategy, but by choosing a price below cost on that side of the 
market, the platform wants to attract more agents on that side of the market, which will 
bring even more agents to the other side. Thus, even with no threat of new competitors, a 
monopoly platform sets a price below cost on one side of the market. The agents on that 
side of the market will attract more agents of the other type, so the platform will be able 
to increase its profit on the other side, and thus its profit overall. Moreover, in such a 
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situation the platform can have positive profit in both the short-run and the long-run. For 
the Base treatment the predicted price for type A agents is equal to 25 francs while the 
cost per costumer on that side is 50 francs. For the Cost increase treatment the predicted 
price for type A agents is equal to 61.5 francs while the cost per costumer on that side is 
90 francs. 
Hypothesis 2. If the equilibrium price on one side of the market is below cost and 
the monopolist is restricted to charge a price at or above cost, the total consumer surplus 
decreases. 
If the equilibrium price on one side of the market is below cost and the 
monopolist is restricted to charge a price above cost, then on that side there will be fewer 
agents because of the increase in price. The decrease in the number of agents on that side 
will lead to fewer agents on the other side also. Even if the monopolist decreases the 
price on the other side in order to maximize the profit, the decrease in price does not 
compensate for the loss in consumer surplus. Overall the consumer surplus decreases. In 
this experimental setting the prediction is that there is a decrease of 66.4% in total 
consumer surplus from treatment Base to treatment Above cost. 
Hypothesis 3. If the monopolist is restricted to charge the same price on both 
sides of the market, the total consumer surplus decreases. 
If a policymaker does not recognize a market as a two-sided market, she might 
force the platform to charge the same price for both types of agents if the service or good 
provided by the platform is the same for every agent. An example is dating websites. 
Wright (2004) cites an article from The San Diego Union Tribute that states that a group 
of lawyers filled a case against several dating services from California and reached an 
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agreement base on gender-pricing discrimination against men. The dating services 
offered discounts for female costumers.  Wall Street Journal (Gold, Reddy (2012)) has an 
article that states that 138 businesses like nail salons in New York City paid fines for 
violating a New York City law against gender-pricing discrimination. While nail salons 
are not classified as a two-sided market, dating websites are classified as two-sided 
market and they are still required to follow gender discrimination legislation. Websites 
like eHarmony.com and Match.com charge the same price both to women and men. 
Imposing such restrictions, the prediction in this experimental environment is that the 
total consumer surplus decreases by 56.6%.  
Hypothesis 4. An increase in the cost per-agent on one side of the market may 
decrease the price on the other side. 
In a one-sided market, an increase in cost induces an increase in price charged by 
the monopolist. In a two-sided market, an increase in the cost per-agent on one side might 
induce an increase in prices on both sides or an increase in price on that side and a 
decrease in price on the other side. The change in price at the equilibrium on one side due 
to a change in cost per-agent on the other side is: 
   
   
 
     
  
            
   
                                                         (  ) 
Given the parameters in the model   
            
      , which implies 
that 
   
   
   if         and 
   
   
   if        . Depending on which side of the 
market it is applied, a tax on one side of the market has different effects on the price on 
the other side. In this experiment, the prediction is that an increase in cost for type A 
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agents induces a decrease in price for type B agents by 23.5 francs which means a 
decrease by 19%. 
5.5 Results 
As noted above, in order to encourage experimentation and help subjects 
investigate and better understand the relationship between the prices they charge and the 
profit they make, the first 10 periods of each treatment were not considered for payment. 
Due to the lack of financial incentives for these first 10 periods, the statistical tests 
presented in this section use data only from the last 10 periods of each treatment. For 
better illustration however, some graphs use the data for all 20 periods of a treatment. 
Result 1. Given strong cross-group externalities, a monopolist in a two-sided 
market charges a price blow cost on one side of the market. 
The result is that the average prices are not close to those predicted in equilibrium. 
But when the Base treatment is not the first treatment in the session, the average price 
charged to type A agents is below cost. Figure 5.5 and 5.6 present the average prices 
charged in session 2 and session 3, when the Base treatment was not the first treatment of 
the session. 
At the individual level only two out of the 16 total subjects in these two sessions 
did not charge type A agents a price below cost. Across three sessions, the average price 
charged to type A agents for the last 10 periods was 43 francs, while the cost was 50 
francs.  
Testing the assumptions of a Student’s t-test, Levene's robust test does not reject 
the null hypothesis of equal variances between different orders of the Base treatment 
within each of the three sessions, however t-tests reject the null hypothesis of equal 
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means between session 1 and session 2 (p-value=0.003), and between session 1 and 
session 3 (p-value=0.027). Because the sample population of the Base treatment in 
session 1 comes from a different distribution, I provide the results of a one-sample one-
tailed t-test of the null-hypothesis mean price>cost (50 francs) for session 1 separately 
from sessions 2 and 3. For sessions 2 and 3 the null hypothesis is rejected (p-value=0.001) 
and the mean price charged to type A agents is equal to 36.1 francs. This result supports 
hypothesis 1 that a monopolist in a two-sided market with no threat of new entry charges 
a price below cost on one side of the market. On the other hand a t-test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the mean price is equal to the optimal price of 25 francs (p-value=0.001). 
However, for session 1 the null hypothesis is not rejected and the mean price for 
type A agents equals 56.6 francs. The lack of experience of the subjects or the existence 
of a restriction not to charge a price below cost before Base treatment might affect the 
behavior of the monopolist. 
Session 1 was the only session that had a mean price above cost for type A agents 
above cost, and also the only session in which the Base treatment was the first treatment 
of the session. Figure 4.5 presents the average prices per period charged in session 1. The 
graph shows that even with no restriction that prohibits setting a price below cost, on 
average the subjects did not charge a price below cost, contrary to the prediction of the 
model. Looking at the individual choices, figure 4.6 shows that only two out of eight 
subjects charged a price below cost (50 francs). 
Evaluating the deviation from the equilibrium in terms of payoffs, figure 5.7 
shows the profit loss for the Base treatment in all three sessions. Due to the fact that 
subjects do not charge prices below cost on side A, despite the fact that the optimal price 
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is below cost , there is a bigger profit loss for first session. The profit loss decreases in the 
next two sessions, once subjects start to charge a price below cost, consistent with the 
equilibrium prediction. 
Result 2. A policy that restricts a monopolist to charge prices above cost reduces 
total consumer surplus. 
Figure 4.7 presents the average consumer surplus per period for the Base and 
Above Cost treatments for all three sessions. 
Levene's robust test rejects the null hypothesis of equal variances between prices 
for type A agents from session 1 and 2 (p-value=0.007), and from session 1 and 3 (p-
value=0.009). Welch's t-tests reject the null hypothesis of equal price means of the Above 
cost treatment (for type A agents) only between session 1 and 3 (p-value=0.12), but the 
differences between means are not as high as in the Base treatment. Session 3 has the 
highest mean price at 58.8 francs, which is 6.8 francs above the mean price in session 1 
and 3.5 francs above the mean price in session 2. Similar to the Base treatment, the Above 
Cost treatment has a higher mean price for type A agents for the sessions in which the 
Above Cost treatment is the first treatment. Thus, no matter what the second treatment is 
within a session, the subjects use their experience from the first treatment to charge prices 
closer to the predicted prices in the second treatment of the session. The t-test rejects the 
null hypothesis that the mean price is equal to the optimal price of 50 francs for session 1 
(p-value=0.033), and sessions 2 and 3 (p-value=0.007). 
Differences from one session to another session are also observed in terms of the 
decrease in consumer surplus across treatments. For the first session there is an average 
decrease of 7% in consumer surplus from the Base treatment to the Above Cost treatment. 
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For session 2 the average decrease in consumer surplus is 28% and in session 3 is equal 
to 21.8%. 
In terms of the average consumer surplus, Levene's robust test rejects the null 
hypothesis of equal variances between the Base treatment and the Above Cost treatment 
(p-value=0.001). Welch's t-test rejects the null hypothesis of equal means between the 
Base treatment and the Above Cost treatment (p-value=0.001). A two-sample Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test also rejects the null hypothesis of equal means between these 2 treatments 
(p-value=0.001). A policy that requires that the prices must be above cost decreases total 
consumer surplus in this experimental environment by 18.1%. 
Table 4.4 shows the results of random effect model estimation using average 
consumer surplus as the dependent variable. The coefficient for the variable Treatment is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, which indicates that the average consumer surplus 
decreases from the Base treatment to the Above Cost treatment. The coefficient for the 
variable Order is also statistically significant at the 1% level which indicates that there is 
an increase in consumer surplus when the treatment is run later in the session.  
These results support hypothesis 2, that consumer surplus decreases when a policy 
requires a price above cost. 
The observed decrease of 18.1% is less than the predicted decrease of 66.4%. The 
difference between the predicted value and the actual value is explained by the fact that 
the average prices in the Base treatment are not close to the predicted prices. For type A 
agents the average price of 43 francs is below the cost of 50 francs but is still 18 francs 
above the predicted price of 25 francs. On the other hand, for the Above Cost treatment 
the average price for type A agents is equal to 55.3 francs, just 5.3 francs above the 
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predicted price. This means the subjects were less able to attract an optimal number of 
agents under the Base treatment, which implies a lower consumer surplus than predicted 
and also a decrease in the difference between the consumer surpluses in the two 
treatments. 
Similarly to consumer surplus, a small difference in profits that monopolists 
obtain is observed between the two treatments. In the first session, when the Above Cost 
treatment is  not the first treatment, the profit loss is insignificant. Once the order of the 
treatments is reversed the average percentage profit loss for the Base treatment is less 
than the average percentage profit loss for the Above Cost. Another observation is that 
subjects are able to increase the profit within sessions for the Above Cost treatment, while 
for the Base treatment profit stays almost the same. The average profit losses in the two 
treatments are displayed in  figure 5.10. 
Result 3. A policy that constrains a monopolist to charge the same price on both 
sides of the market reduces total consumer surplus. 
This treatment was a search problem in one dimension so it was not difficult for 
the subjects to find the equilibrium price. As such, this treatment was only included in 
session 1. The average price charged by the subjects is displayed in figure 4.9. 
The overall average price for the last 10 periods is equal to 74.9 francs while the 
equilibrium price is 75 francs. A Student t-test does not reject the null hypothesis that the 
mean price for the Same Price treatment is equal to the equilibrium price (p-value=0.242). 
Regarding the average consumer surplus per period, Levene's robust test rejects the null 
hypothesis of equal variances between the Base treatment and the Same Price treatment 
139 
 
(p-value=0.00). A Welch's t-test, that allows for unequal sample sizes, rejects the null 
hypothesis of equal consumer surplus means between the two treatments (p-value=0.001).  
The decrease in consumer surplus between these two treatments is equal to 10.4%. 
This result supports hypothesis 3 that a policy that imposes the same prices for both types 
of agents decreases consumer surplus. 
In the Same Price treatment subjects choose the equilibrium price, which 
indicates that they maximize they profit under this treatment. Figure 5.10 supports this 
conclusion. 
Result 4. An increase in the cost per-agent on one side of the market induces a 
decrease in the price charged to the agents on the other side of the market. 
For this treatment there are two important observations. First, the average price in 
the last 10 periods charged to type B agents is equal to 98.35 francs. This implies that 
there is a decrease in the price for type B agents compared to the price in the Base 
treatment, where the average was 108.25 francs. Second, the price charged to type A 
agents is always lower than the cost per-agent on that side. The figure 4.12 and 4.13 
present the prices charged in the High Cost treatment for the two sessions. 
For the prices for type B agents, Levene's robust test rejects the null hypothesis of 
equal variances between the Base treatment and the High Cost treatment (p-value=0.02). 
A Welch's t-test for unequal sample sizes rejects the null-hypothesis of equal price means 
between Base treatment and High Cost treatment (p-value=0.022). The mean price for 
type B agents is lower in the High Cost treatment than in Base treatment by 9.9 francs 
(9.1%). A two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test also rejects the null hypothesis of equal 
price means between the two treatments (p-value=0.01). This implies that a policy that 
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increases the cost on one side of the market will decrease the price that the monopolist 
charges on the other side of the market. This result supports hypothesis 4. 
Related to the prices charged to type A agents, in the High Cost treatment, a one-
sample t-test rejects the null-hypothesis that mean price>cost=90 francs (p-value=0.001). 
Also the null-hypothesis that mean price=predicted price is rejected (p-value=0.11). The 
mean price is equal to 66.5 while the predicted price is equal to 61.5 francs. These results 
support hypothesis 1, that a monopolist with no threat of new entry charges a price below 
cost on one side of the market. However, the subjects do not charge the optimal price. 
The difference between the optimal prices and the average prices on the two sides 
of the market is reflected in the profit loss. Figure 5.17 presents the average profit loss in 
percentage per each period in the two sessions. 
5.6 Conclusions 
This paper presents the experimental design and the initial results of an economic 
experiment that studies the price structure in a two-side market monopoly and the effects 
of different policies on price structure and total consumer surplus. Theoretical models, 
from the relatively new literature on two-sided markets, show that the optimal price 
structure can have such prices that can mislead the policymakers.  
In this laboratory environment, the predicted price for type A agents is only one-
half of the per-agent cost for the side of the market that provides a strong demand 
externality to the other side. While this can be viewed by a naïve policymaker as a 
predatory pricing strategy, results 1 and 4 show that most of the monopolists charged a 
price below cost even if they did not have a threat of new competitors.  
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However, contrary to the prediction of the model, there were subjects that did not 
charge a price below cost under the Base treatment. The only situation when the subjects 
charged an average price above cost, even if the optimal price was below cost on that side 
of the market, was when the treatment with no restriction on price setting occurred before 
a treatment that imposes such restriction. This might have been because of lack of 
experience of the subjects. Also the fact that there was initially no constraint on price 
before the Base treatment in session 1 can also explain why subjects did not charge a 
price below the cost per-agent, close to the optimal price. This implies that platforms with 
inexperienced managers might not charge the optimal prices if there is no initial 
regulation in the market. If there was a regulation and the regulation is removed, the 
prices tend to be the optimal prices. If the goal of a policymaker is to help platforms to 
charge the optimal prices, a good strategy for the policymaker is to impose a price 
regulation for a short time period and then remove it. 
A policy that requires the monopolist to charge a price above cost leads to a 
decrease in total consumer surplus, as does a policy that imposes the same price for both 
types of agents. The decreases in consumer surplus are not as big as the predicted 
decreases, but there still is a statistically significant difference in means. Also a tax that 
leads to an increase in the cost per-agent for type A agents, contrary to the effect in a one-
sided market, decreases the price for type B agents. 
The goal of this paper is to offer empirical evidence that will help policymakers to 
implement some regulations in such markets. The results prove that two-sided markets 
have counterintuitive properties and suggest that policymakers should pay attention to the 
type of the market, one-sided or two-sided, and that regular policies might not have the 
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desired effects in a two-sided market. Future research should try to find answers to 
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Figure 5.8 Session 1 – Prices for type A agents for each subject in the Base treatment5 
 
  
                                                 
5
 For a better illustration of the average consumer surplus, I add 8000 units to the values from the data. I 
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6
 For a better illustration of the average consumer surplus, I add 8000 units to the values from the data. I 
chose 8000 units because it maintains the correct proportions of the actual average consumer surplus for 
both treatments. For the Base treatment the average consumer surplus in each period represents the average 
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7
 For the Base treatment the average consumer surplus in each period represents the average of the 
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Table 5.1 Values for the parameters of the model 
 
Parameters 
Side Alpha (α) Cost (f)8 Const. (d) 
A 0.1 50 (90) 100 
B 1.3 50 100 
 
  
                                                 
8
 For the High Cost treatment the cost on side A increases from 50 francs to 90 francs. 
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Table 5.2 The equilibrium prices, the equilibrium number of agents, total profit and total 
consumer surplus 
    Treatment 
Equilibrium Side Base Above cost Same price High Cost 
Price 
A 25.0 50.0 75.0 61.5 
B 125.0 107.5 75.0 101.5 
Number of 
agents 
A 83 57 32 44 
B 83 66 66 56 
Profit   4150 3795 2450 1627 





Table 5.3 Order of the treatment in each session 
Order of the 
treatments 
Session 
I II III 
1 Base Above cost Above cost 
2 Above cost Base High Cost 





Table 5.4 The effects of imposing a policy that requires prices to be set above cost on 









(dummy ; Above Cost=1) (87.21) 
 
Order of the treatment 610.6** 






Number of session 3 
Standard errors in parentheses 






This experiment is about the economics of decision making. The instructions are 
simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you may earn a 
considerable amount of money which will be paid to you privately in cash at the end of 
the experiment. 
Your payoff (or earnings) will be determined by your choices. All earnings will 
be in terms of francs. 350 francs will be converted to 1US dollar. 
The information on your screen is private. Please do not talk to your fellow 
participants while the experiment is in progress. This is important to the validity of the 
study. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come 
to you and answer your question privately. 
Description of the market 
You own and manage a firm that helps two types of customers interact. We will 
call these customers “type A” and “type B”. Your firm is the only firm in the market and 
no other firm can enter the market. Each of the two types of customers is interested in 
interacting with customers of the other type, but can only do so through your firm, after 
paying you a price for it. Your task is to choose the price that each type of customer has 
to pay your firm for this service. The price that you charge customers of type A might be 
the same price or not as the price you charge customers of type B. 
In this experiment, customers of each type are computer simulated. They will 
decide if they want to pay for your service depending on two things: 
1. The price you charge them: holding everything else constant, the higher 
the price you charge, the less likely they are to use your service (this is true for both types 
of customers). 
2. The number of customers of the other type that are also using your service: 
holding everything else constant, the likelihood that a customer of type A decides to pay 
for your service increases with the number of customers of type B that are currently using 
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your service (and the other way around). So if you manage to attract one extra customer 
of type A, then your service will become more valuable to every customer of type B, and 
this increase in valuation will be the same to EVERY customer of type B (the same goes 
the other way around).  In today’s experiment holding everything else constant, the 
valuation that each type has for the other will be the following: for each additional 10 
type A customers that will join your business, 13 more type B customers will join your 
business too. But for each 10 type B customers that will join your business just 1 more 
type A customer will join your business. That means that type B customers value type A 
customers more than type A customers value type B customers. 
Example: 
During the experiment the number of customers is rounded to the nearest whole 
number, but in this example for better illustration the number of customers is rounded to 
one decimal. 
Assume that there is a firm that charges type A customers 60 francs and type B 
customers 60 francs for joining its business. Then there will be 50.6 type A customers 
that join the business and 105.8 type B customers that join its business (see the first line 
of the next 2 tables). Also assume the valuation that each type has for the other is the one 
from the previous paragraph. 
First assume that the firm reduces the price for type A customers by 2 francs (see 
the second line of the next table), then another 2.3 type A customers will join the business. 
But even if the price for type B customers is the same, another 3 type B customers will 
join the business because now there are more type A customers in that business. If the 
firm lowers the price it charges the type A customers even more, then more type A 
customers will join the business. Again, more type B customers will join the business 









Example of lowering the price for type A costumers 
Period 
Price that the 
business 
charges type A 
customers 






charges type B 
customers 




1 60 50.6 60 105.8 
2 58 52.9 60 108.8 
3 56 55.2 60 111.8 
4 54 57.5 60 114.8 
 
Now assume that the firm lowers the price for type B customers by 2 francs (see 
the second line of next table), you can see that 2.3 more type B customers will join the 
business. But because type A customers are less interested in interacting with type B 
customers, the increase in the number of type B customers will increase the number of 
type A customers by only 0.2. 
 
Example of lowering the price for type B costumers 
Period 
Price that the 
business 
charges type A 
customers 
Number of type 







Number of type 
B customers 
that joined the 
business 
1 60 50.6 60 105.8 
2 60 50.8 58 108.1 
3 60 51.0 56 110.4 





(end of the example) 
You face a constant cost of 50 francs for each type A customer that joins your 
business and a constant cost of 50 francs for each type B customer that joins your 
business. The difference between the price that you charge one type of customers (for 
example type A customers) and the cost that your firm has for that type of customer (in 
this example 50 francs) is the profit per-customer. If you multiply this difference times 
the number of customers of that type (type A customers in our example) that joined your 
business, you get the profit from that type of customer. The total profit for that period is 
the sum of the profit from type A customers and the profit from the type B customers 
minus a fixed cost. The fixed cost will be displayed on your screen and it stays constant 
during each part of the experiment. However, it may change from one part to the other 
part. You do not have to calculate your profit each period; this value will be displayed on 




This experiment will have 3 parts with 20 periods each. In each period you must 
choose the prices to charge type A customers and type B customers that join your 
business.  The first 10 periods of each part will not be chosen for payment, so you may 
use those periods to investigate the relationship between the prices you charge and the 
profit you make. Two periods will be randomly chosen from the last 10 periods of each 
part (a total of 6 periods) and your total earnings in francs will be equal to the sum of the 
total profits for these 6 periods. 
You will submit your chosen prices for each period using your computer. At the 
beginning of each new period the computer will show information about the outcomes 
from the previous periods. All that is required from you is to carefully choose the prices 
for your firm for each period. 
At the end of each period your computer screen will show: 
·  the prices that you charged each period; 
·  the number of customers of each type that joined your business each period; 
·  the profit you earned each period. 
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